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ABSTRACT 
Using an interactive laboratory experiment, I start to investigate how third-party 
evaluations of judgments on ill-structured problems affect the decision quality of those being 
evaluated (“evaluatees”).  First, an evaluatee completes an ill-structured estimation task.  I deem 
the amount and type of costly procedures performed by the evaluatee to make that estimate their 
“judgment.”  An evaluator then evaluates this judgment to determine whether the evaluatee should 
perform additional costly work to improve the estimate.  Finally, the evaluatee may perform any 
additional work and adjust their estimate.  I manipulate the evaluators’ level of focus on the 
quantity of work performed by evaluatees (more vs. less) and when evaluators document their 
assessment of evaluatees’ judgment (before vs. after conversing with evaluatees).  I find that 
evaluators focused more on the quantity of work who document their initial assessment before 
conversing with evaluatees request greater amounts of the procedure they (i.e., evaluators) rate as 
more diagnostic but do not request greater amounts of the procedure they rate as less diagnostic.  
Evaluators’ behavior is consistent with theories of confirmation bias.  Second, I find that 
evaluatees perform the additional work requested and, over time, learn to perform some of it before 
the evaluation.  Third, this additional work generally improves evaluatees’ decision quality.  I then 
examine the tradeoffs between performing procedures of differently-rated diagnosticities on 
decision quality.  While results suggest that better decision quality occurs when evaluatees use a 
combination of the procedures, evaluators seem to over-request (and, thus, evaluatees over-
perform) procedures that evaluators rate as more diagnostic.  Therefore, while third-party 
judgment evaluations can improve decision quality on ill-structured problems, they may 
suboptimally do so.  The theory and results of this study have implications for both accounting and 
non-accounting areas where judgments on ill-structured problems are evaluated by third parties. 
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Applying appropriate judgment on ill-structured problems is a key component of 
professional practices including medicine, law, management, and accounting (e.g., Peecher et al. 
2013).  To maintain a consistent and sufficiently high level of judgment in these areas, such 
judgments are often subject to evaluations by third parties.  However, it remains unclear under 
what circumstances these “third-party judgment evaluations” are more or less likely to improve 
decision quality.  Therefore, this paper’s central research question is, ceteris paribus, “How do 
third-party evaluations of judgments affect decision quality on ill-structured problems?”  To 
answer this broad research question, this study examines three smaller questions about the 
judgment evaluation process: (1) When are third-party evaluators more apt to question evaluatees’ 
judgment? (2) How do evaluatees respond?, and (3) Do such evaluations improve evaluatees’ 
decision quality?   
Such questions are important to accounting due to the many ill-structured problems 
accountants encounter (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015) and the several unique types and levels of 
judgment evaluations by third parties required by the accounting profession itself and, 
increasingly, governmental regulation (e.g., Zeff 2003a, Zeff 2003b, DeFond 2010, Houston and 
Stefaniak 2013, Peecher et al. 2013, DeFond and Zhang 2014).  For example, the SEC requires 
public company managers to have their judgments about the preparation of annual financial 
statements (i.e., an ill-structured problem) evaluated by auditors (i.e., a third-party evaluation) 
before being released to investors, tax judgments are subject to review by the IRS, auditors have 
their audit judgments evaluated by other auditors and, more recently, by regulators.  The 
pervasiveness of this last type of third-party evaluation, regulators’ evaluation of auditors’ 
judgment, is unique to accounting. In a broad sense, the Public Company Accounting Oversight 
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Board (PCAOB) represents a new type of oversight where subjective judgment is, for the first 
time, regulated (e.g., Gradison and Boster 2010, DeFond 2010, Peecher et al. 2013).  Other 
professions do not face such guaranteed scrutiny of their judgments by regulatory third parties at 
specific time intervals like auditors face with the PCAOB.  Moreover, the difficulty of regulating 
auditor judgment is highlighted by Kinney (2008) who poses the question, “Can standards setters 
and regulators write and enforce adequate standards for forming and evaluating judgments and 
especially judgments about judgments?” (Kinney 2008, p. 4).  This situation is a main reason why 
judgment evaluations should be studied in greater depth in accounting.  However, as all professions 
become increasing complex, the problems to be solved become more ill-structured, and the 
judgments become increasingly subjective (e.g., Griffith et al 2015), such regulation could well 
become more pervasive in other professions to prevent “bad” judgment.  For these reasons, 
examining and better formalizing how judgments on ill-structured problems are evaluated by third 
parties and their effect on decision quality are increasingly relevant research topics. 
This study makes a first step towards that goal of understanding third-party judgment 
evaluations on ill-structured problems by developing an experimental framework to answer those 
initial research questions posed above.  The experimental framework offers a controlled analysis 
of key stages within this third-party judgment evaluation process as well as the evaluators’ and 
evaluatees’ behaviors within each of those stages. 
To begin examination of third-party evaluations of judgments on ill-structured problems, I 
investigate two common variables that vary significantly among and within the different types of 
such third-party judgment evaluations: (1) evaluators’ level of focus on evaluatees’ quantity of 
work and (2) when evaluators initially document their assessment of evaluatees’ judgment.  The 
first variable relates to the stated goal of all accounting professionals (evaluators and evaluatees) 
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to improve decision quality (e.g., Libby et al. 2002, Bonner 2008, Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, 
Francis 2011, Trotman et al. 2011, Knechel et al. 2013, DeFond and Zhang 2014, Bhaskar 2016, 
PCAOB 2016a).  However, reasonable professionals can (and do) disagree about judgments such 
as the amount and type of work necessary to improve decision quality on ill-structured problems 
(e.g., DeFond 2010, Gramling et al. 2011, Blankley 2012, Houston and Stefaniak 2013, Peecher 
et al. 2013, DeFond and Lennox 2015).  While performing more work should, intuitively, improve 
decision quality, evaluators’ fixation on work quantity could, ironically, harm decision quality if 
it causes evaluatees to overuse diminishingly effective procedures to make that decision (Budescu 
et al. 2012, Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016).) or only safe, standardized procedures (e.g., Kang 
et al. 2017). 
The second variable, when evaluators document their assessment of evaluatees’ judgment, 
also varies significantly in practice (e.g., Gibbins and Trotman 2002, Libby et al. 2002, Bonaccio 
and Dalal 2006, Bonner 2008, Lambert and Agoglia 2011, Houston and Stefaniak 2013).  One 
such variation is whether evaluators document their initial assessment before conversing with 
evaluatees.  Theory and prior findings suggest that this seemingly minor change may have a 
significant impact on how a judgment is ultimately evaluated (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 
Joyce and Biddle 1981, Kunda 1990, Klayman 1995, Kunda 1999, Frank and Hoffman 2015).  If 
evaluators document their initial assessment before conversing with evaluatees, evaluators may 
discount or altogether ignore evaluatees’ reasoned judgment about the amount and type of work 
performed to make their decision on the ill-structured problem.  This response ultimately could 
hinder their commonly held goal of improving decision quality. 
To study the process of third-party evaluations of judgment on ill-structured problems and 
their effects on decision quality, I develop an experiment that captures key motivations, incentives, 
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and stages of the process.  To enhance internal validity, the experiment’s baseline setting makes 
several assumptions to control potential confounds which exist in the natural setting.  One key 
such assumption is to ensure that evaluators have the same incentives, information, and training as 
their evaluatees.  This baseline allows me to determine whether an “ideal” and “generic” third-
party judgment evaluation process improves decision quality on ill-structured problems.  Each 
period, an evaluatee completes an ill-structured problem requiring significant estimation.  To make 
the estimate decision, the evaluatee can use two available types of procedures.  I deem the amount 
and type of procedures selected by the evaluatee their “judgment.”  An evaluator then evaluates 
that judgment by assessing the sufficiency and appropriateness of the evaluatee’s work performed 
to make that estimate decision accurately.  If the evaluator thinks the work is insufficient or 
inappropriate, the can request additional work. 
I develop three predictions.  One, I predict that when evaluators focus more on the quantity 
of work performed by evaluatees and document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment 
before conversing with them, they will request evaluatees perform greater amounts of the 
procedure they (i.e., the evaluators) rate as more diagnostic.  However, the same will not be true 
for the procedure rated as less diagnostic.  For this prediction, I draw inferences from theories 
about confirmation bias.  These theories state that: (1) when information is ambiguous, individuals 
will tend to interpret such information in the direction of a predominant hypothesis and (2) 
individuals have a psychological need for consistency between their beliefs and behaviors 
(Klayman 1995).  As such, evaluators prompted with the possibility that the quantity of evaluatees’ 
work is insufficient will interpret ambiguous information about the work performed and its 
potential effects on decision quality in the direction of this predominant insufficient work 
hypothesis.   
5 
Subsequently, to maintain consistency between their beliefs and behaviors, evaluators with 
an insufficient work belief/hypothesis will request additional work be performed and, more 
specifically, more of the procedure they rate as “better” (i.e., more diagnostic).  Even when 
evaluators are given an opportunity to adjust their documented initial assessment after conversing 
with evaluatees, evaluators who physically documented their initial assessment will be less willing 
to change it.  This evaluator behavior will occur because subsequently adjusting an initial 
assessment that they already have physically documented will more directly and tangibly violate 
their psychological need for behavioral consistency.  However, evaluators who do not physically 
document their initial assessment likely will be more willing to adjust their initial assessment after 
conversing with evaluatees since such behavior would feel less inconsistent. 
Two, I predict that evaluatees will perform the additional work requested by evaluators 
after the evaluation and, over time, learn to perform some of this additional work before the 
evaluation.  This behavior should occur because adaptive learning occurs with timely feedback 
(e.g., Tan and Libby 1997, Hannan et al. 2010).  A key tension in these first two predictions is that, 
since all participants (i.e., both evaluators and evaluatees) have the same incentives, information, 
and training, evaluators generally should request similar amounts of additional work and 
evaluatees generally should, ultimately, perform similar amounts of work regardless of their 
evaluators’ requests.  If they behave differently across my experimental conditions, it indicates 
that psychological factors distort the economic ones which, in turn, may significantly affect 
decision quality. 
Last, I predict that, on average, additional work performed by evaluatees will improve 
decision quality on the ill-structured problem.  A research question then explores the tradeoff 
between the two available types of procedures and their decision quality effects.  Commentaries, 
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monographs, and peer-review studies advocate the potential value of combining evidence from 
different sources to improve decision quality (Bell et al. 1997, Bell et al. 2005, Peecher et al. 2007, 
Trotman and Wright 2012, Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016).  As such, it is unclear whether 
performing greater amounts of the procedure evaluators rate as more diagnostic or combining it 
with procedures evaluators rate as less diagnostic will improve the evaluatees’ decision quality 
more on the ill-structured problem. 
To test these predictions, I use an abstract, multi-period experiment.  As explained below, 
this method is currently the best one to address my research questions.  Student participants are 
randomly assigned to be either an evaluator or an evaluatee.  Each period, I randomly pair an 
evaluator with an evaluatee.  The evaluatee completes the ill-structured task of estimating the 
number of colored marbles in a jar using two available procedures: (1) view pictures of the 
filled/empty jar and its dimensions or (2) draw a sample of individual marbles to determine their 
color.  The ill-structured nature of this task is that there is no established template about the amount 
of each procedure that should be performed to improve the estimate.  Therefore, the evaluatee’s 
“judgment” is the amount of time devoted to each type of procedure.  After the evaluatee submits 
an initial estimate, the evaluator evaluates this judgment, the pair chats, and the evaluator can 
request additional work.  After the evaluatee performs any additional work and updates their 
estimate, the pair’s compensation is calculated.  The evaluator and evaluatee have the same 
incentives.  In each round, each participant type’s payoff is determined only by the evaluatee’s 
final estimate error and time spent performing the procedures.   
Notably, I perform my experimental manipulations only on evaluators. I manipulate 
whether they focus more on the quantity of evaluatees’ work by displaying or not displaying 
reminders that additional work can improve evaluatee’s estimate accuracy.  I also manipulate 
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whether or not evaluators can document their initial assessment of evaluatees’ judgment before 
conversing with them by either allowing or disallowing evaluators to physically record their initial 
assessment before they chat with evaluatees.  The dependent variables are the amount and type of 
additional procedures that evaluators request, amount and type of procedures evaluatees perform 
pre- and post-evaluation, and evaluatees’ final estimate error. 
Results support my predictions.  Despite having the same incentives, training, and 
information, the experimental manipulations on evaluators cause both evaluators and evaluatees 
to behave differently.  Regarding evaluators, when they focus more on evaluatees’ quantity of 
work and document their initial assessment of evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them, 
evaluators request greater amounts of the procedure they rate as more diagnostic.  In all other 
conditions, evaluators similarly request relatively less of this “better” procedure.  Moreover, 
evaluators do not request relatively more of the procedure they rate as less diagnostic.  Regarding 
evaluatees, they perform the additional work requested by evaluators after the evaluation and, over 
time, learn to perform some of it before the evaluation.  This additional work generally improves 
decision quality on the estimation task.  Thus, overall, third-party judgment evaluations can 
improve decision quality on ill-structured problems.  However, additional analyses show that they 
may not improve it as much as they could. 
In additional analyses, I examine the decision quality effects of performing different 
amounts of the two available procedures.  Results suggest that a combination of the two procedures 
may improve decision quality more than simply performing greater amounts of the procedure 
evaluators rate as more diagnostic.  Before evaluation, the procedure evaluators rate as more 
diagnostic does, indeed, improve decision quality while the other procedure does not.  However, 
after evaluation, these results “flip,” and the procedure rated as less diagnostic improves decision 
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quality while the other procedure does not necessarily improve it.  These results suggest that 
evaluators overly focused on the quantity of work performed could, ironically, cause worse overall 
decision quality on ill-structured problems.  Commentaries have conjectured the possibility of such 
unintended consequences (Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016). 
This study contributes to the accounting literature and practice in several ways.  One, it 
starts a stream of research to more directly examine the process of third-party judgment evaluations 
when encountering ill-structured problems.  The theory and results from this “first-step” study 
have implications for several accounting areas where third-party evaluation of judgment on ill-
structured problems occurs such as external auditors’ evaluation of managements’ assertions, 
external auditors’ evaluation of internal auditors’ work, audit firms’ internal quality reviews, audit 
firms’ peer audit quality reviews, PCAOB audit inspections, SEC investigations, and IRS audits.  
In a broad sense, the PCAOB represents a new type of oversight where, for the first time, subjective 
judgment is guaranteed to be evaluated by a regulatory third party at specific time intervals (e.g., 
Kinney 2005, Simunic 2005, DeFond 2010, Peecher et al. 2013).  Other professions do not 
currently face such guaranteed and recurring inspections by a regulatory third party.  Therefore, 
accounting is the natural setting to start studying the process of third-party judgment evaluations 
and how variations among them affect decision quality.  Such insights can benefit other professions 
if/when they face similar changes.  For example, my results support the criticism that regulatory 
inspections may overprescribe procedures that inspectors believe are more diagnostic and distrust 
evaluatees’ judgment to use a combination of different procedures that could better improve 
decision quality (Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016).  Moreover, while regulators generally deny 
incentivizing their inspectors to request evaluatees perform more work (Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
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Correia 2014), theory and my results suggest that even having perceived prompts or incentives to 
do so may affect evaluators’ behavior. 
This study also has potential implications for the psychology literature and, more 
specifically, confirmation bias theories.  First, this study shows that confirmation bias is not just a 
unidirectional phenomenon where an internal cognition affects external behavior but, instead, can 
be a circular phenomenon where that external behavior can then affect internal cognition.  In this 
study, this circular phenomenon occurs when evaluators physically document their initial 
assessment of evaluatees’ work before conversing with them.  That is, while evaluators’ internal 
beliefs about the insufficiency of evaluatees’ work (prompted by the experimenter) cause their 
external behavior of requesting additional work before conversing with evaluatees, that external 
behavior then affects future beliefs about the (in)sufficiency of the evaluatees’ work after 
conversing with evaluatees.  Second, the results suggest that evaluators engage in a heuristic that 
I deem “attribute complement” where they conflate the concept of “more work” with “better 
procedures.”  More specifically, while evaluators are prompted to distrust only the quantity of 
work performed and could request more of both types of procedures, they only request relatively 
more of the self-rated “better” (i.e., more diagnostic) procedure.  This behavior likely occurs 
because “more work” and “better procedures” are perceived to complement each other more than 
“more work” and “less diagnostic procedures.”  Third, this study provides evidence that very 
minimal circumstances are necessary to activate the psychological need for behavioral 
consistency.  More specifically, when evaluators physically document their initial assessment by 
simply moving two sliders on the computer screen, this action is sufficient to trigger the need for 
consistency and evaluators become less likely to change their assessment when given the 
opportunity to do so after conversing with the evaluatees.  Alternatively, from an economic 
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standpoint, the cost to change their initial assessment is essentially zero; but from a psychological 
standpoint, it appears to be much higher.  However, this need for consistency is mitigated when 
evaluators are disallowed from physically documenting their initial assessment.  These results 
suggest that if such initial assessment processes are formalized in practice (e.g., evaluators must 
officially document or report their initial assessment before conversing with their respective 
evaluatees), they may inadvertently trigger evaluators’ need for consistency to the detriment of 
decision quality.  To mitigate such outcomes, organizations may be advised to minimize such 
formalizations to allow their evaluators psychological flexibility to adjust their initial assessments 
after additional information is received from conversations with evaluatees.  Fourth, this study 
shows that the effects of confirmation bias may not be mitigated by (1) incentives or (2) another 
party without such bias.  In the experiment, both evaluators and evaluatees have the same 
incentives, information, and training.  As such, economic theory suggests that all evaluators should 
request similar amounts of additional work regardless of any prompts.  However, confirmation 
bias causes evaluators to request different amounts.  Moreover, even evaluatees who have the same 
incentives as evaluators and on whom no experimental manipulations are performed, still do not 
mitigate the effects of evaluators’ confirmation bias by simply performing similar amounts of 
additional work. 
From a methodological standpoint, I develop a flexible experimental framework to 
investigate the third-party judgment evaluation process.  It is difficult to obtain uncensored 
evidence from evaluatees about their respective evaluators (and vice versa) due to time, 
availability, and confidentiality constraints.  Moreover, U.S. governmental entities that regulate 
accounting and auditing such as the SEC, IRS, and PCAOB appear to disallow their professionals 
from engaging directly in academic research.  This framework is also helpful because it is also 
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very difficult to directly investigate this process using archival methods or a single-person 
contextual experiment.  Perhaps most importantly, I can directly manipulate evaluators’ behavior 
and then analyze both evaluators’ and evaluatees’ responses.  This ability is especially useful for 
studying situations where the externally valid evaluators would come from U.S. governmental 
entities and are, otherwise, unexaminable.  Second, even with a single-person contextually-rich 
experiment, one cannot disentangle natural confounds such as the differences in incentives, 
training, information, experiences, and biases between different types of evaluators and evaluatees.  
Abstract experiments with neutral, non-contextually rich labels and nonprofessional participants 
can control or actively manipulate these variables to make clearer causal inferences about their 
effects on the third-party judgment evaluation process and decision quality for ill-structured 
problems.  Third, in any third-party judgment evaluation especially one with an ill-structured 
problem, it is a difficult and subjective task to determine whose judgment is “correct” or improves 
decision quality more (e.g., Bonner 2008, Peecher et al. 2013).  In my task, I have an objective 
final answer to compare (i.e. actual estimate error).  This definitive correct answer gives strong 
internal validity by allowing rank ordering of evaluatees’ performance on the ill-structured task.  
However, this enhanced internal validity potentially sacrifices external validity.  While the task 
performed by experimental participants is ill-structured, most ill-structured problems in the real 
world do not have a “correct” answer.  To the extent that having a definitive correct answer changes 
the underlying nature of the ill-structured problem and the process of third-party judgment 
evaluations, it limits the generalizability of my theory and results.    
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II. BACKGROUND, THEORY, & HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 BACKGROUND 
2.1.1 Judgments on Ill-Structured Problems in Accounting.  The responsibly to exercise 
good judgment on ill-structured problems is a key tenant of what it means to be a professional 
(Gibbins 1984, Zeff 2003a, Zeff 2003b, Hurtt et al. 2013, Peecher et al. 2013).  For example, the 
AICPA defines professional judgment as “applying relevant training, knowledge, and experience 
within the context provided by relevant professional and technical standards, as applicable, in 
making informed decisions about courses of action that are appropriate in the circumstances” 
(AICPA 2017).  The accounting setting has several examples of such judgments on ill-structured 
problems.  Financial statement preparers apply judgment when selecting which accounting 
standards to apply and control systems to design to ensure financial statement are presented fairly 
and accurately to financial statement users (e.g., SEC 2008).  Similarly, tax professionals must use 
judgment when determining taxable and non-taxable income, allowable deductions and 
exclusions, and estimates of tax reserve accounts for uncertain tax positions (e.g., Hanlon and 
Heitzman 2010).  During a financial statement audit, auditors exercise their judgment when 
choosing which accounting and auditing standards to apply, the nature/extent/timing of audit 
procedures to perform (PCAOB 2016d), and what conclusions to draw from audit evidence 
gathered (e.g., Peecher et al. 2013, PCAOB 2016c).   
Gibbins (1984) offers a framework to conceptualize and study public accountants’ 
professional judgments.  He defines professional judgment as “the judgment of people who have 
experience in the area and who are using their judgment as part of their work activities” (p. 105).  
He frames the judgment process as a “Learning Model” which includes the following stages: the 
professional’s previous experience and accumulated learning, the triggering event or stimulus, the 
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operating environment including the stimulus situation and feedback, and the professional’s 
decision/action or response (or lack thereof).  Taken together, the previous stages “characterize 
judgment as a largely responsive process of producing preferences for action” (p. 106).  The 
experimental design, discussed below, captures these key stages and elements of the Gibbins 
(1984) model. 
I distill the above definitions into the core idea that judgments on ill-structured problems 
are the amount and type of work performed to make an informed and accurate decision for that 
problem.   
2.1.2 Third-Party Evaluations of Judgments on Ill-Structured Problems in Accounting.  I 
define a third-party judgment evaluation as any process where a third party assesses the sufficiency 
and appropriateness of the amount and type of work performed by an evaluatee to make their 
informed and accurate decision.   
Several third-party evaluations of judgment exist in accounting to ensure one group of 
accounting professionals comply with standards and apply good judgment.  For example, financial 
statement preparers for public companies must be audited (e.g., Zeff 2003a), tax professionals are 
subject to IRS reviews (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010), and auditors complete work paper 
reviews (e.g., Rich et al. 1997, Trotman et al. 2015), internal engagement quality reviews (“firm 
review”) (e.g., Houston and Stefaniak 2013), external peer reviews (e.g., Hilary and Lennox 2005, 
Lennox and Pittman 2010), and external inspections by regulators (i.e. PCAOB) (e.g., Hilary and 
Lennox 2005, Löhlein 2016). 
Auditor work paper reviews are one unique type of third-party judgment evaluation which 
have been studied extensively in the accounting research (e.g., Gibbins and Trotman 2002, 
Trotman et al. 2011).  However, third-party judgment evaluations of interest in the current study 
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are much broader than work paper reviews in three key aspects.  First, and most importantly, work 
paper reviews have a definitive hierarchy where the supervisor/superior has more experience and 
authority than the subordinate.  In fact, auditing standards require work paper reviewers to have 
more experience and expertise than the auditor being evaluated (PCAOB 2016b).  As such, the 
decision of the superior must be accepted lest the subordinate risk reprimand.  Said alternatively, 
the superiors’ opinion, due to more training and experience, is presumed to be better than the 
subordinate’s opinion.  However, in other third-party judgment evaluations, only an implied 
hierarchy exists between the evaluator and evaluatee.  That is, it is understood that one professional 
(i.e., the evaluator) has the authority and right to question/criticize another professional’s (i.e., 
evaluatee) judgment.  For example, IRS agents have the authority and right to question a tax 
preparer’s classification of taxable/non-taxable items just as auditors have the authority and right 
to question any of managements’ assertions.  It is this power that gives the evaluator the implied 
higher rank in the evaluator-evaluatee relationship.  However, just because the evaluator has this 
power, it does not mean the evaluator has more experience or expertise than the evaluatee.  In fact, 
the reverse may be more common.  Self vs. governmental oversight is often characterized as a 
tradeoff between expertise and independence where, presumably, practitioners have greater 
expertise while external evaluators have greater independence (e.g., Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
DeFond 2010).  Therefore, the evaluatee (i.e., implied subordinate) may choose to accept or 
challenge the opinion of the evaluator (i.e., implied superior).  Whose judgment is correct is, by 
definition, a subjective judgment.  Second, in many third-party judgment evaluations unlike work 
paper review, the evaluator and evaluatee likely do not work for the same organization.  This lack 
of shared identity should limit the connection or bond between evaluator and evaluatee and could 
even increase the tension between them (Tajfel 1970, Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Kennedy and 
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Peecher 1997, Goncalo and Duguid 2008).  Third, and related to the previous point, incentives of 
evaluators and evaluatees vary among the different professional judgement evaluations.  For 
example, incentives are more aligned for evaluators and evaluatees in the same organization (i.e., 
work paper and internal audit firm quality reviews) but may diverge for external peer quality 
reviews (e.g., be harsh on the reviewed firm in hopes of gaining market share) (Bedard et al. 2008) 
and inspections (e.g., incentives to find errors or request more work) (Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
Bedard et al. 2008, Daugherty and Tervo 2010, Houston and Stefaniak 2013, Correia 2014). 
Thus, a key contribution of the current study is the flexible experimental framework 
developed which can be modified to address each of the different third-party judgment evaluation 
settings discussed above.  Moreover, this framework can be used to investigate an important set of 
problems faced by practitioners, ill-structured problems for which there is no established method 
of solving that problem.  However, since this study is the first to examine third-party evaluations 
on ill-structured problems in general, a “baseline” third-party judgment evaluation is modeled.  
That is, given the differences in experience/training, information, and incentives among the 
different third-party judgment evaluations, this study controls these variables to determine if/when 
professional evaluations in their “ideal” or “generic” form improve decision quality.  Such 
experimental choices offer strong internal validity to make strong causal inferences about the 
process and its participants.  
The judge-advisor (aka “advice taking literature”) (e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2006) can 
offer some insights about third-party judgment evaluations but also differs from the third-party 
judgment evaluation process in several key aspects.  First and foremost, in an advice setting, 
advisors are making recommendations directly related to the outcome decision (e.g., estimations 
of probabilities, appropriate accounting treatment for a complex transaction, etc.).  In a third-party 
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judgment evaluation setting, evaluators’ recommendations are usually only indirectly related to 
the outcome decision.  That is, evaluators evaluate the amount and type of work performed by the 
evaluatee to solve an ill-structured problem and may request additional work to indirectly enhance 
or justify the evaluatee’s outcome decision.  However, evaluators do not usually make any 
recommendations directly about the outcome decision or replace the evaluatee’s outcome decision 
with their own.  Second, a judge often seeks advice to share responsibility and accountability for 
the decision outcome (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006) whereas responsibility for the decision outcome 
is not necessarily intended to be shared by evaluators and evaluatees for third-party judgment 
evaluations (e.g., Kaplan and Williams 2013).  Third, no implied hierarchy necessarily exists in 
judge-advisor relationships.  This directly impacts the level of authority and right of the advisor to 
question/criticize the judge’s judgment.  Fourth, advice is generally solicited voluntarily by the 
judge from the advisor.  Third-party judgment evaluations are generally involuntary and required 
by either professional standards (e.g., peer review of audit engagements) or law (e.g., IRS audits) 
and, often, unwelcomed by the evaluatee (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Blankley et al. 2012, 
Houston and Stefaniak 2013, Peecher et al. 2013).  Similarly, advice taking is often an unofficial 
process whereas third-party judgment evaluations processes are generally an official process.  
Finally, the incentives of the judge and advisor are unclear.  While the stated goal or mission of 
all accounting professionals is to improve decision quality for the benefit of the investing or 
taxpaying public (e.g., IRS 2017, KPMG 2017), it is not clear that an advisor would share the same 
goal as the judge, and vice versa.  For example, advice giving has been connected to the potential 
egocentric and status needs of the advisor and, similarly, there are social reasons why judges may 
seek and take advice even if it is bad advice (Bonaccio and Dalal 2006).  Moreover, as discussed 
above, judges have incentives to seek advice to dilute their responsibility for an outcome whereas 
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evaluators generally have no intention of sharing such responsibility (Hurtt et al. 2013, Peecher et 
al. 2013). 
2.2 EVALUATOR PREDICTIONS 
To make all predictions about evaluators’ behavior, I draw on two main underpinning of 
confirmation bias: individuals’ (1) tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence in the direction of 
their predominant hypothesis and (2) psychological need for consistency between one’s beliefs 
and behaviors (Klayman 1995). 
Ideally, while any similar third-party evaluator would evaluate the same judgment 
similarly, different individual evaluators have varying incentives, goals, and mindsets which likely 
affect their evaluations of judgments (Kinney 2005, Nelson 2009, DeFond 2010, PCAOB 2012, 
Houston and Stefaniak 2013, Glover et al. 2014, Glover and Prawitt 2014, Nolder and Kadous 
2017).  For example, some evaluatees believe that their evaluators have goals (and even incentives) 
to find errors with their work (Bedard et al. 2008, Daugherty and Tervo 2010, Houston and 
Stefaniak 2013).  Such beliefs may not be wholly unfounded (Barduch and Kagan 1982, Correia 
2014, Knechel 2016).  An important mindset which varies considerably both among and within 
evaluators is the presumption (i.e., before an evaluation process even begins) regarding the 
sufficiency of evaluatees’ work performed (Hammersley 2011, Nelson 2009, Hurtt et al. 2013, 
Nolder and Kadous 2017).  One such setting where this presumption could vary is when the 
preexisting similarity between evaluator and evaluatee differs.  Most likely, more [less] similarity 
of evaluators to their evaluatees induces higher [lower] sufficiency presumptions about the 
evaluatees’ work (Tajfel 1970, Petty and Cacioppo 1986, Kennedy and Peecher 1997, Goncalo 
and Duguid 2008).  For example, evaluators who are governmental regulators (e.g., SEC, IRS, 
PCAOB) and less similar to their private sector evaluatees may have a lower sufficiency 
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presumption than private sector evaluators who monitor similar evaluatees (e.g., peer review of 
audit work papers).   
Such different mindsets can be induced by simple prompts.  Evaluators with a prompt to 
focus on the quantity of work performed will want additional work performed by evaluatees.  In 
general, prompts simply focus one’s thinking in a particular direction which can affect one’s 
mindset and interpretation of information received (e.g., Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009, Lynch et 
al. 2009, Bowlin 2011, Wainberg et al. 2013).1  For example, prompts to think more iteratively or 
strategically can improve fraud assessments (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009) and fraud detection 
(Bowlin 2011, Hobson et al. 2016).  Prompts to be more skeptical cause auditors to identify more 
risk factors (Bedard and Graham 2002).  As such, if evaluators are prompted to focus more on the 
quantity of work performed, they should, naturally, develop a distrust about the sufficiency of 
work already performed by the evaluatees (Kunda 1990, Ditto and Lopez 1992, Kunda 1999, 
Klayman 1995, Kadous et al. 2003, Hales 2007).  This evaluator behavior is due to the first 
important underpinning of confirmation bias, the tendency to interpret ambiguous evidence in the 
direction of a predominant hypothesis (Klayman 1995).  More specifically, evaluators with an 
insufficient work hypothesis will interpret ambiguous information about evaluatees’ work 
performed in the direction of this hypothesis.  Moreover, when evaluators have this insufficient 
work hypothesis, they will want additional work performed by evaluatees to address it.  This 
evaluator behavior can be inferred from the second important underpinning of confirmation bias, 
individuals’ psychological need for consistency in beliefs and behavior (Klayman 1995).  That is, 
                                                          
1 While prompts do not appear to have been formally defined, similar concepts are found in the literature including 
“decision-aids” (e.g., Wainberg et al. 2013), “content facilitation” (e.g., Lynch et al. 2009) and, simply, “prompt” 
(e.g., Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009, Bowlin 2011).   
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if evaluators believe that the work performed by evaluatees is insufficient, evaluators should want 
additional work performed because this behavior is consistent with their beliefs.   
Evaluators who want additional work performed by evaluatees will only want relatively 
more of the procedure they (i.e., evaluators) rate as more diagnostic or “better.”  While 
confirmation bias theories predict the direct effect of a work quantity prompt on the amount of 
additional work evaluators will want evaluatees to perform, the theories do not necessarily predict 
the indirect effect on the type of additional work.  However, logical extensions of these theories 
predict that evaluators will only want evaluatees to perform relatively more of the procedure they 
(i.e., evaluators) believe is “better.”  This evaluator behavior can also be inferred from an 
individuals’ psychological need for consistency in beliefs and behavior (Klayman 1995).  Wanting 
“more work” and wanting “better procedures” are likely perceived to be more consistent with each 
other than, for example, “more work” and “less effective procedures.”  I deem such behavior, 
“attribute complement” because this behavior mimics complement products in economics whose 
demand increases/decreases in tandem (e.g., ketchup and fries) (Mas-Colell et al. 1995).  Attribute 
substitution is an established psychological phenomenon where individuals substitute a difficult 
concept or question for an easier one (Kahneman and Frederick 2002).  In accounting, investors 
substitute the difficult concept of assessing relevance with an easier one of assessing reliability 
when making fair value judgments (Kadous et al. 2012).  Similarly, I predict that evaluators will 
complement the concept of “more work” with “better procedures” when responding to evaluatees.  
Unlike attribute substitution, neither concept is necessarily more difficult or easier, but, instead, 
20 
like complements the two concepts should increase in tandem2.  As such, evaluators who want 
additional work will want relatively more of the procedure they perceive as “better.”   
While evaluators should want evaluatees to perform more of the “better” procedure for the 
reasons described above, I predict evaluators will only actually request this additional work if they 
also document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them.  
This evaluator behavior is also due to the psychological need for consistency in beliefs and 
behavior (Festinger 1962, Klayman 1995).  That is, if evaluators believe that the work performed 
by evaluatees is insufficient and evaluators can act on these beliefs before conversing with 
evaluatees by documenting their initial assessment, they will seek consistency between their 
beliefs and behavior by requesting more work and, more specifically, more of the “better” 
procedure. 
Finally, evaluators who focus more on the quantity of work performed and document their 
initial assessment before conversing with evaluatees will be less willing to adjust their initial 
assessment after conversing with evaluatees.  While a first-order prediction of confirmation bias 
theories is that evaluators with an insufficient work hypothesis will match their pre-chat behaviors 
to their pre-chat beliefs, confirmation bias theories do not necessarily predict the second-order 
effect that evaluators will then adjust their post-chat beliefs to match those self-imposed pre-chat 
behaviors.  However, such a response can also be inferred indirectly from the psychological need 
for consistency.  Physically documenting an initial assessment will likely exacerbate this need and 
evaluators who do so can avoid behaving inconsistently by not adjusting their documented initial 
                                                          
2 “More” and “better” seem to be naturally and psychologically intertwined.  This conflating of the two concepts is 
evidenced each time someone uses the common adage “more is not always better.”  A simple search online for 
“more is better” or “more is not better” delivers several articles across psychology, economics, management, 
marketing, and biology (to name just a few) whose title is a play on those phrases (e.g., Schwartz 2006, Solnick and 
Hemenway 1998, Dranove et al. 2003). 
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assessment after conversing with the evaluatees.  Instead, these evaluators will adjust their post-
chat beliefs to match their already documented initial assessment.  Said alternatively, they will 
adjust their post-chat beliefs to match their pre-chat behavior.  However, evaluators who do not 
physically document their initial assessment (i.e., it is only “in their mind”) would not face such a 
tangible inconsistency of adjusting their initial assessment and, thus, be more willing to adjust it.  
That is, they will match their post-chat behavior to their post-chat beliefs.  This prediction, if true, 
would show that confirmation bias is not just a unidirectional phenomenon where an internal 
cognition affects external behavior (e.g., Klayman 1995) but that it may also be a circular 
phenomenon where that external behavior then affects a subsequent internal cognition. 
Examples related to each of those underpinnings of confirmation bias (i.e., interpretation 
of ambiguous evidence and need for consistency) appear in the accounting literature.  First, several 
methods can induce such individuals to interpret ambiguous evidence in the direction of the 
predominant or favored hypothesis. These include, but are not limited to, accountability and 
justification to others (Lerner and Tetlock 1999), incentives (Camerer and Hogarth 1999, Mayhew 
and Pike 2004, Jollineau et al. 2014), and prompts (Hoffman and Zimbelman 2009, Lynch et al. 
2009, Bowlin 2011, Wainberg et al. 2013).  When various groups or individuals do engage in such 
behavior, studies show that, for example, auditors assess their clients’ explanations as better and 
clients’ integrity as higher (Peecher 1996), auditors’ favorably interpret ambiguous financial 
reporting standards (Kadous et al. 2003), audit committees’ justify either aggressive or 
conservative reporting (Magilke et al. 2009), investors’ agree/disagree with stock value 
information (Hales 2007) as well as credit analysts’ ratings (Jollineau et al. 2014), jurors change 
their assessment of negligence (Grenier et al. 2015), and supervisors adjust performance 
evaluations (Luft et al. 2015).  These studies suggest that confirmation bias can cause individuals 
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to ignore diagnostic information that could otherwise improve a decision on an ill-structured 
problem. 
Several studies also demonstrate individuals’ psychological need for consistency.  For 
example, when auditors are given an initial starting value and are not [are] familiar with a task 
such as fraud estimation [audit sampling], they [do not] anchor on this value (Joyce and Biddle 
1981).  However, auditors show such need for consistency regardless of task familiarity when the 
auditor self-generates their own starting value (Butler 1986).  Even knowing the starting value is 
wrong does not necessarily eliminate this need for consistency.  These studies suggest individuals 
do not always adjust their behavior even when it could improve a decision (Tversky and Kahneman 
1974, Staw 1976, Joyce and Biddle 1981, Staw 1981, Tan 1995, Epley and Gilovich 2001, Kadous 
and Sedor 2004, Janiszewski and Uy 2008).  A pertinent psychology study tested the “general 
wisdom” that one should not change their first answer on an exam.  Kruger et al. (2005) show that 
while individuals who do change usually improve on a test, most are reluctant to do so.3 
Taken together, the literature on confirmation bias and two of its important underpinnings 
help hypothesize evaluators’ behavior.  While similar evaluators should evaluate the same 
judgment similarly, these theories suggest they can evaluate the same judgment quite differently 
depending on environmental factors.  More specifically, evaluators prompted to focus more on the 
quantity of evaluatees’ work performed will want evaluatees to perform relatively greater amounts 
of the procedure they (i.e., evaluators) rate as more diagnostic.  However, only if the evaluators 
also document their initial assessment will they actually request that evaluators perform this 
additional work. 
                                                          
3 Kruger et al. (2005) call this behavior the “first instinct fallacy.”  While they use counter-factual theories to 
hypothesize this behavior where individuals seek to avoid the “pain” of being wrong if they change their answer, their 
results also fit well with the psychological need for consistency. 
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H1: When evaluators focus on the quantity of evaluatees’ work performed and document 
their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them, 
evaluators will request greater amounts of the procedure they rate as more diagnostic. 
2.3 EVALUATEE PREDICTIONS 
There are several reasons to believe that additional work requested by evaluators should 
not affect evaluatees’ behaviors.  First, since incentives, information, and training are constant 
across all participants (i.e. both evaluatees and evaluators) and experimental conditions, behavior 
should be the same in all experimental conditions.  Second, incentives to reach the best outcome 
(i.e., highest payoff) should attenuate the effects of a different focus caused by innocuous prompts 
(Kunda 1990, Kunda 1999).  Third, there is no reason that evaluatees must perform the additional 
work requested by evaluators.  This is especially true since my experiment (1) minimizes 
reputation effects and coordination efforts by randomly pairing evaluators and evaluatees each 
round and (2) does not penalize evaluatees for not performing the additional work.  Fourth, since 
manipulations occur only on evaluators, it is not obvious that the manipulations will affect 
evaluatees’ behavior.  However, learning theories and prior studies suggest that evaluatees will 
behave differently in different experimental conditions. 
Literature on learning suggests that evaluatees will likely perform the work requested by 
evaluators. Implicit learning occurs when individuals learn, adapt to, or anticipate situations and 
act accordingly (Roth et al 1991, Seger 1994).  This learning often occurs after repeated 
interactions (e.g., Hertwig and Ortmann 2001).  Established examples of such learning are in the 
social norms (e.g., Cialdini et al. 1991, Cialdini and Trost 1998) and workplace tacit knowledge 
(e.g., Tan and Libby 1997) literature.  Tacit knowledge of how to manage oneself, others, and their 
own career is learned from repeated social interactions (Wagner and Sternberg 1985, Reber 1989, 
Tan and Libby 1997, Bol et al. 2015).  For example, workers naturally learn to increase their 
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productivity when surrounded by more productive coworkers (Falk and Ichino 2006, Mas and 
Moretti 2009). 
Accounting examples of such learning are found in the budgeting and controls literature.  
Over time, subordinates learn to adjust their budgets in accordance with a superiors’ propensity to 
reject budgets with slack (Hannan et al. 2010, Rankin et al. 2008).  Managers also learn to propose 
different projects depending on the owner’s stated level of commitment to them (Rankin et al. 
2003).  Formal controls can alter individuals’ behavior and these learned behaviors persist even 
after the control is removed (Tayler and Bloomfield 2011).   
Given the above literature, the evaluatee will likely perform the additional work requested 
after the evaluation and, over time, learn to perform some of it before the evaluation. 
H2a [H2b]: When evaluators focus on the quantity of evaluatees’ work performed and 
document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them, 
evaluatees will perform greater amounts of the procedure evaluators rate as more 
diagnostic after [before] the evaluation. 
2.4 DECISION QUALITY PREDICTION & RESEARCH QUESTION 
Since the task is a real effort task, I hypothesize that any additional work performed by 
evaluatees should improve decision quality regardless of its type and timing.   
H3: More work will improve decision quality. 
The third hypothesis intentionally does not distinguish between the different types and 
timing of work because, with a real effort task, any additional work should improve the outcome.  
Moreover, it is possible that the approach to most improve decision on an ill-structured problem 
may be to spend all available time only on the procedure rated (by the evaluator) as more 
diagnostic.  However, monographs and commentaries conjecture that combining a procedure rated 
as more diagnostic with one rated as less diagnostic may actually be more effective overall (Bell 
et al. 1997, Bell et al. 2005, Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016).  “Evidentiary triangulation” is the 
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idea that complementary evidence from differing sources “establish[es] a basis for developing and 
revising sufficiently well-justified beliefs” (Bell et al. 1997, Bell et al. 2005, p. 5, Peecher et al. 
2007, Trotman and Wright 2012).  A research question explores this possibility.   
RQ: Does combining procedures of differently-rated diagnosticities improve overall 
decision quality?  
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III. RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1 BACKGROUND 
Participants complete a real-effort, ill-structured task of estimating the number of colored 
marbles in various shaped/sized jars (see examples in Appendix B).  The interactive game uses z-
Tree software (Fischbacher 2007).  The experiment took approximately two hours.   
While the current study uses student participants instead of professionals, it does capture 
the stages and elements that the Gibbins (1984) “Learning Model” framework considers necessary 
to examine judgments made by professionals.  First and importantly, previous experience and 
accumulated learning is equalized among all participants in the experiment.  More specifically, 
experimental participants are given equal training and learning opportunities on the same 
judgmental task.  Such a controlled learning setting is ideal to test a “Learning Model” and its 
underlying theory (Friedman and Sunder 1994, Hertwig and Ortmann 2001, Peecher and Solomon 
2001) because it allows all participants to similarly develop their knowledge structure about the 
same judgmental task.  Practicing professionals would have different prior experiences and 
accumulated learning.  With limited experimental time, it would be difficult to equalize all 
professional participants’ understanding about a contextual judgmental task.  Second, once that 
knowledge structure is developed, it is activated by a triggering event or stimulus.  In the current 
experiment, the knowledge structure developed during the practice round and any previous rounds 
is triggered each period by a variant of the same judgmental task (i.e., number of marbles in various 
shaped/sized jars).  Third, Gibbins (1984) states that “the environment contains pressures, 
motivations, rules, constraints, feedback, and other phenomena that may be important to 
responding” (p. 105).  As a self-contained laboratory environment, each of those elements are 
established via the experimental instructions, task itself, and incentives/payoff structure.  
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Additionally, evaluatee participants receive direct feedback about their judgment (i.e., amount and 
type of work selected to make the marble estimation) from the evaluator participants and all 
participants receive indirect feedback about performance via their payoff at the end of each round.  
Fourth, examining participants’ decisions/actions/responses (or lack thereof) given the 
experimental manipulations are some of the key dependent variables of the current study.  More 
specifically, the amount and type of work performed (or lack thereof) by the evaluatee both before 
and after the evaluation as well as their final estimation are some of the main dependent variables 
of interest.  Taken together, this abstract experimental design captures the necessary elements of 
Gibbins (1984) “Learning Model” conceptualization of professionals’ judgment process where 
evaluatees respond to triggering events using previously developed knowledge structures to act 
most appropriately given the environmental constraints. 
3.2 KEY ELEMENTS 
The experimental design also captures several other key elements of the real world third-
party judgment evaluation process, including:  
1) An implied hierarchy of evaluators over evaluatees is instantiated.4 
In the natural setting, third-party judgment evaluations do not have a definitive 
hierarchy.  As such, evaluators do not necessarily have more experience or expertise 
than the evaluatee and, therefore, the evaluator’s opinion may not be better than their 
evaluatee.  Only an implied hierarchy exists in third-party judgment evaluations where 
it is understood that the evaluator has the authority and right to question/criticize the 
evaluatee’s judgment. 
In the current experiment, this implied hierarchy is instantiated in four ways.  First, 
during the instructions and game, the evaluatee is referred to as the “Initial Checker,” 
while the evaluator is referred to as the “Final Checker.”  Second, participants complete 
a power manipulation where Initial Checkers are asked to “Type about another time 
when someone had power and authority over you and judged your work such as a 
parent, teacher, or boss,” while Final Checkers are asked to “Type about another time 
                                                          
4“Evaluatee,” “Evaluator,” “Judgment,” and other contextually rich words are used here for expositional purposes but 
were not used in the experimental materials.  Instead, I used more neutral words such as “Initial Checker,” “Final 
Checker,” “work done,” etc. 
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when you had power and authority over someone and judged their work such as a child, 
student, or employee.”  Third, all participants hear and view the exact same instructions 
which state that, “The Initial Checker will guess the number of each marble color in a 
jar” and “The Final Checker will say if the work done [by the Initial Checker] is good 
or not.”  This sentiment is reiterated twice more during the instructions when the 
participants are reminded that, “The Final Checker will decide if the Initial Checker 
does a good or bad job.” Fourth, during the game the Initial Checkers view screens that 
state, “The Final Checker reviewed your work for your first guess.  The Final Checker 
may have asked for more work,” and they also view options that state “Submit work 
for first/final review [by the Final Checker].”  Similarly, Final Checkers see screens 
that state, “As the Final Checker, you will review the work done by the Initial Checker” 
and options that state “Submit your first/final review [to the Initial Checker].”  
2) The task is ill-structured and difficult to solve. 
In the natural setting, judgments are most needed on ill-structured problems for which 
no established method for solving the problem necessarily exists and determining the 
solution is difficult (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015).   
In the current experiment, Initial Checkers must estimate the number of marbles in 
various shaped/sized jars.  Correctly estimating even a small number of items in a jar 
is a difficult task and there is not an established method for doing so (e.g., Davis 1997).   
3) Evaluatees know that their additional work will be reviewed by the evaluators. 
In the natural setting, while third-party judgment evaluations may only have an implied 
hierarchy and evaluatees may challenge or ignore evaluators’ suggestions, evaluatees 
understand that their work will be reviewed by the evaluators to ensure evaluatees at 
least consider evaluators’ suggestions.  Moreover, in some circumstances evaluators 
may have legal recourse/sanction if evaluatees do not sufficiently consider and respond 
to evaluators suggestions, even if the evaluatee ultimately chooses not to accept the 
evaluators’ suggestions (e.g., Hanlon and Heitzman 2010, Peecher et al. 2013). 
In the current experiment, Initial Checkers are told that, “The Final Checker will review 
the additional work you do for your final guess.”  However, as discussed more below, 
Initial Checkers understand that they do not have to perform any additional work and 
that no penalty is incurred for not doing so.  Moreover, all participants understand that 
they are randomly paired each period.  As such, potential reputation effects are 
minimized.  
4) Evaluatees make a judgment (input). 
In the natural setting, different professionals may select different methods and 
procedures to solve the same ill-structured problem (e.g., Peecher et al. 2013).  
Moreover, the evaluatee has autonomy to choose the amount and type of procedures to 
perform to improve their decision quality on such a problem. 
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In the current experiment, Initial Checkers must choose the amount of two available 
types of procedures to perform (described in more detail below) to estimate the number 
of marbles.  Two procedures offer a simplified version of the more complex natural 
setting where professionals have many choices of procedures. 
5) Evaluatees’ judgment affects decision quality (output). 
In the natural setting, a judgment about the amount and type of work to perform leads 
to a final decision (Gibbins 1984).  In accounting, this final decision is generally an 
assertion (e.g., going concern opinion, fairly presented financial statements) or a 
numeric financial statement amount (e.g., fair value of level 2 asset, income tax 
provision) (SEC 2008).  As more work is performed, the decision quality should 
improve (e.g., more accurate going concern opinion, income tax provision, etc.) or, at 
the very least, it should not worsen (Budescu et al. 2012). 
In the current experiment, Initial Checkers choose the amount and type of work to 
perform to estimate the number of marbles in a jar.  As more work is performed, Initial 
Checkers’ estimate should improve or, at the very least, it should not worsen. 
6) The evaluators do not make the same judgment or decision as the evaluatees. 
In the natural setting, the evaluator does not make the exact same judgment as the 
evaluatee but, instead, evaluates the judgment made by the evaluatee to solve an ill-
structured problem.  Similarly, the evaluator does not make the same decision as the 
evaluatee but, instead, evaluates the judgment that lead to that decision.  
In the current experiment, Initial Checkers choose the amount and type of work to 
perform to estimate the number of marbles in a jar.  Final Checkers do not make either 
of those judgments or decisions but, instead, evaluate the sufficiency and 
appropriateness of the amount and type of work performed by the Initial Checker to 
accurately estimate the number of marbles. 
7) Evaluators have incomplete information about evaluatees’ work, but may request. 
In the natural setting, evaluators are not necessarily given the complete set of 
information used by their evaluatees to make their judgment.  Instead, a summary of 
the evaluatees’ judgment is given and additional details may be requested by the 
evaluators, if desired (Houston and Stefaniak 2013). 
In the current experiment, Final Checkers are only given a summary of the work 
performed by Initial Checkers (e.g., time on each procedure, number of marbles drawn, 
etc.).  However, Final Checkers and Initial Checkers are given the opportunity to chat 
electronically during which Final Checkers may ask the Initial Checker about any 
additional details desired. 
8) Evaluators may request additional work from evaluatees, but evaluatees do not have to 
perform the additional work. 
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In the natural setting, one professional (i.e., the evaluator) has the authority and right 
to question/criticize another’s (i.e., evaluatee) judgment.  However, the evaluatee does 
not have to accept the evaluator’s opinion and may choose to challenge it instead 
(DeFond 2010, Blankley et al. 2012).  That is, evaluators may question the sufficiency 
and appropriateness of the work performed by the evaluatee (i.e., their judgment) and 
may request additional or different work be performed.  However, the evaluatee, after 
consideration, may choose to not perform any additional work. 
In the current experiment, Final Checkers evaluate Initial Checkers’ work to determine 
if the amount and type of work performed is sufficient and appropriate to estimate the 
number of marbles.  The Final Checkers may then request additional work of either 
procedure be performed by the Initial Checkers.  However, all participants know, via 
both instruction and incentives, that Initial Checkers were neither required nor punished 
for not performing the additional work requested by Final Checkers.  Data indicates 
that some Initial Checkers did ignore Final Checkers’ requests for additional work (i.e., 
did not perform any additional work). 
9) Evaluatees can adjust their judgments and decisions after evaluation. 
In the natural setting, if evaluators do request additional work after the evaluation, 
evaluatees may perform it.  Additionally, evaluatees can adjust their original decision 
(e.g., going concern opinion, income tax provision, etc.) after the evaluation.   
In the current experiment, the Initial Checkers can perform additional work after the 
evaluation and update their estimate for the number of marbles in the jar. 
10) Accuracy of the final decision is a significant component of all evaluatees and 
evaluators compensation. 
In the natural setting, the stated5 goal of all accounting professionals and their 
evaluators is to improve decision quality (e.g., more accurate going concern opinion, 
income tax provision, etc.) (IRS 2016, PCAOB 2016a, Bhaskar 2016, Knechel et al. 
                                                          
5 While different groups of professionals (e.g., managers, auditors, PCAOB inspectors, IRS agents, etc.) may have 
different or additional incentives, every groups’ publicly stated goal or mission is to improve decision quality for the 
benefit of third-party users of the relevant information (e.g., the investing or taxpaying public, the government, etc.).  
For example, the mission statement of the IRS (which, presumably, has an unstated goal of maximizing revenue to 
the government) states that the organization strives to, “Provide America's taxpayers top quality service by helping 
them understand and meet their tax responsibilities and enforce the law with integrity and fairness to all” (IRS 2017).  
Since the intent of this “first step” study is to determine whether an “ideal” and “generic” third-party judgment 
evaluation process improves decision quality on an ill-structured problem, I focus on this stated goal of all professional 
to improve decision quality.  The different or additional incentives of different groups of professionals offer fruitful 
future research opportunities once a baseline understanding of the third-party judgment evaluation process has been 
established.  For example, in external peer quality reviews of audits, the reviewing firm may have incentives to be 
harsh on the reviewed firm in hopes of gaining market share (Bedard et al. 2008), PCAOB inspectors may have 
incentives to find errors or request more work (e.g., Correia 2014) while auditors have incentives to resist any 
additional work or admit bad judgment (e.g., Blankely et al. 2012), and IRS inspectors likely have incentives to 
maximize the total revenue collected from the taxpayer while the taxpayer has incentives to minimize their tax bill. 
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2013, Francis 2011).  Poor judgment and decision quality may result in significant 
sanctions and penalties if discovered. 
In the current experiment, both the Initial Checkers and Final Checkers are given the 
exact same payoff structure which includes a component for the Initial Checkers’ 
marble estimation accuracy.  The worse the estimation, the lower their payoff.  
(Additional details of the compensation are discussed in see section 3.6 Compensation 
Calculation.) 
11) There is uncertainty regarding evaluators’ actions and behaviors. 
In the natural setting, evaluators are uncertain about how their judgments will affect 
evaluations.  While evaluatees may preemptively perform additional work that they 
think evaluators will request (Houston and Stefaniak 2013), doing so does not 
guarantee that evaluators will accept that work performed as sufficient or appropriate.   
In the current experiment, the pre-evaluation work performed by Initial Checkers does 
not have any direct effect on the amount and type of additional work that Final 
Checkers may request after the evaluation.  While Final Checkers can consider the 
Initial Checkers’ pre-evaluation work during their evaluation, there is no requirement 
for the Final Checkers to do so.  Said alternatively, Final Checkers may request any 
amount or type of additional post-evaluation work regardless of Initial Checkers’ pre-
evaluation work.   
3.3 KEY ASSUMPTIONS 
This experiment is a “first step” in studying third-party judgment evaluations to determine 
whether an “ideal” and “generic” third-party judgment evaluation process improves decision 
quality on ill-structured problems.  To develop this “baseline” setting, I intentionally make several 
key assumptions to control potential confounds which exist in the natural setting and to allow a 
cleaner and more rigorous test of the underlying theory.  First, all participants in the experiment 
(i.e., both Initial and Final Checkers) receive the same level of training and information for the 
task.  In the natural setting, the evaluatees and their evaluators likely have different levels of 
training and information.  In fact, evaluatees often have more training and information than their 
evaluators (DeFond 2010).  Second, all participants are given the same incentives.  More 
specifically, in each round both the Initial and Final Checker’s payoff is determined only by the 
Initial Checker’s final estimate error and time spent performing work.  In this way, I can ensure 
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all participants are working towards the same goal.  Similarly, Initial [Final] Checkers do not face 
any amplified costs [benefits] when Initial Checkers adjust their marble estimate.  In the natural 
setting, evaluatees have strong financial and reputational incentives to not adjust their original 
decisions while evaluators may have strong incentives for evaluatees to do so (Bardach and Kagan 
1982, Chaney and Philipich 2002, Lennox and Pittman 2010, Correia 2014).  If evaluatees change 
their original decision (e.g., going concern opinion, income tax provision, etc.), they are implicitly 
admitting that their original decision and their judgments leading to that decision were insufficient 
and inappropriate.  Such an admission could cause the evaluatee to face fines, sanctions, and lose 
clients.  Evaluators, on the other hand, could benefit from evaluatees changing their original 
decision based on the additional work requested by the evaluators because it supports the argument 
that such third-party evaluators are necessary to ensure good judgment (Bardach and Kagan 1982, 
Correia 2014).  Third, an Initial Checker is randomly paired with a Final Checker each period.  In 
the natural setting, it is possible that the same evaluator will evaluate the same evaluatee over 
multiple periods because it allows the evaluator to develop an understanding and expertise about 
the evaluatee’s processes and procedures (Bamber and Bamber 2009, Chi et al. 2005, Bowlin et 
al. 2015).  However, in this experimental setting, this random assignment removes the possibility 
of reputation building (e.g., a cooperative/lazy Initial Checker, easy/harsh Final Checker) and 
unintended coordination between the pair (e.g., Initial and Final Checker agree to “split the work”).  
Fourth, Initial Checkers do not have to perform any additional work requested by Final Checkers.  
While evaluatees in the natural setting may disagree with evaluators’ requests for additional work, 
evaluatees often sufficiently address or perform the additional work requested to appease or 
“manage” their evaluators (e.g., Bonaccio and Dalal 2006, Blankley et al. 2012, Merkl-Davies et 
al. 2011, Houston and Stefaniak 2013).  While completely disregarding evaluators’ requests may 
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technically be allowed, doing so could result in additional indirect costs to evaluatees such as 
adjudication proceedings to determine whose judgment is “correct” and increased scrutiny by the 
snubbed evaluators during future evaluations.  Moreover, if the adjudication proceedings find that 
the evaluatee’s judgment was incorrect, the evaluatee may suffer additional fines, sanctions, and 
reputational costs.  Fifth, there is no materiality level to determine whether Initial Checkers’ 
estimation is materially correct.  In the experiment, any estimation error is penalized and larger 
estimation errors are penalized exponentially more (see section 3.6 Compensation Calculation for 
additional details).  In the natural setting, an evaluatee’s decision is not usually considered wrong 
unless it violates a materiality threshold (e.g., Budescu et al. 2012, PCAOB 2016e).  For example, 
financial statement accounts with a small misstatement due to random error would not invalidate 
management’s assertion or the auditor’s opinion that the financial statements are fairly presented.  
However, what is deemed material is, itself, a judgment which is contingent on both the amount 
and circumstances (e.g., a small misstatement due to fraud is still material) (e.g., Nelson et al. 
2005, Kachelmeier et al. 2014).  Last, an ill-structured task that has a definitively correct answer 
is chosen to objectively rank order performance on the task.  Most ill-structured problems in the 
real world do not have a correct answer.  While this experimental design choice significantly 
enhances internal validity by removing experimenter judgment about participants’ performance, it 
may limit external validity to the extent that having a correct answer changes the nature of solving 
ill-structured problems.  All the above assumptions are necessary to establish a “baseline” setting 
and cleanly test the underlying theory. 
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3.4 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 80 students (59% graduate, 73% female) at a large university.6  Each was 
randomly assigned to be either an Initial Checker (i.e., evaluatee) or Final Checker (i.e., evaluator) 
for the entirety of the experiment.  I read the instructions aloud as participants followed on their 
screens.  Afterwards, they took a quiz on their understanding of the instructions and compensation 
and played one practice round.  Participants then played as many paid rounds as possible over 
approximately 70 minutes before completing the post-experimental questions and collecting their 
payment.  The average payment was $25 per subject including a $5 show-up fee. 
3.5 EXPERIMENTAL TASK 
Each round had four stages: 
• Stage 1: Initial Checker’s Pre-Evaluation Work 
• Stage 2: Evaluation 
• Stage 3: Initial Checker’s Post-Evaluation Work 
• Stage 4: Review of Initial Checker’s Post-Evaluation Work 
Two procedures were available to improve the estimate of the number of marbles in a jar: 
• Procedure I: View images of the filled/empty jar and its dimensions (see examples 
in Appendix B) 
• Procedure II: Draw individual marbles to determine the color7 
3.5.1. Stage 1: Initial Checker’s Pre-Evaluation Work.  At the beginning of each round, 
both the Initial Checker and Final Checker were shown the same jar containing marbles of two 
different colors.  Each round had a different shaped/sized jar.  Both the Initial Checker and Final 
Checker immediately answered questions about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles 
of each color in the jar and the usefulness of each procedure to improve their estimate.  The 
participant then arrived at the procedure options menu to choose which of the two procedures 
                                                          
6 Eighty-eight originally participated but eight participants (and their rounds) from a single session were removed 
from analyses because a programming error caused the evaluators to see both work quantity focus manipulations. 
7 Procedure I was designed to help determine the overall total number of marbles in the jar.  Procedure II was 
designed to help determine individual marble colors and, in turn, the ratio of the two marble colors in the jar. 
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(Procedure I or Procedure II) to use.  Any combination of the procedures could be used and as 
many times as desired.  There was no time limit.  The participants also received a “starting 
estimate” number of each colored marble which may have been be overstated.8  All periods were 
overstated except period 5 where the starting guess was correct.  When ready, the Initial Checker 
submitted an estimate for the number of marbles of each color. 
3.5.2. Stage 2: Evaluation.  After the Initial Checker submitted their estimate, the Final 
Checker saw an “Initial Checker work summary screen” with the following information about the 
Initial Checker: total time spent estimating, time spent on each procedure, number of marbles 
drawn, time spent on the difficulty assessment, and the Initial Checker’s difficulty assessment9. 
After reviewing the “Initial Checker’s work summary screen,” Final Checkers saw an 
“evaluation screen” with the following questions: 
1) Overall, how much more work should the Initial Checker do?  
Response: Likert scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) 
with a middle point of “Double” (50) 
2) What percentage of the additional work should the Initial Checker spend on Procedure I?  
Response: Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
3) What percentage of the additional work should the Initial Checker spend on Procedure II? 
Response: Calculated automatically based on Q2 response 
All Final Checkers viewed this “evaluation screen” twice, once before chatting with their 
Initial Checker and once after.  The pair had 75 seconds to chat. 
                                                          
8 After pilot testing, I limited the starting estimate to overstatement errors only.  That is, the starting estimate could be 
higher than the actual number of marbles in the jar, but never lower.  When drawing marbles, the evaluatees basically 
perform an auditing existence test whereby the starting estimate may claim, for example, five black marbles will 
appear in a sample drawn but only four black marbles actually do (i.e., “does not exist” will appear on the auditor’s 
screen for the missing marble). 
9 Final Checkers did not see the Initial Checker’s submitted estimate of the number of marbles of each color.  This 
design choice was made to coax Final Checkers to think about the amount and type of work the Initial Checker 
performed instead of fixating on the estimate itself.  However, the chats were unrestricted and the pair could discuss 
the estimate. 
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3.5.3. Stage 3: Initial Checker’s Post-Evaluation Work.  The Initial Checker received the 
Final Checker’s responses for the three “evaluation screen” questions described above.  Both the 
Initial Checker and Final Checker then returned to the procedure options menu.10  After performing 
any additional work, Initial Checkers submitted a final estimate for the number of marbles of each 
color. 
3.5.4 Stage 4: Review of Initial Checker’s Post-Evaluation Work.  After the Initial 
Checker submitted their updated estimate, Final Checkers repeated the “Initial Checker work 
summary screen” (see section 3.5.2. Stage 2: Evaluation for discussion of this screen) but with 
two columns, one for the work performed before the evaluation and one for the work performed 
after it.  The first column showed the same “Initial Checker work summary screen” information as 
before.  The second column showed any additional work performed by the Initial Checker after 
the evaluation.  This review of the Initial Checker’s additional post-evaluation work was included 
to mimic the real world setting where an evaluatee would have any additional work reviewed by 
their evaluator.  Initial Checkers were informed that this review of their post-inspection work 
would occur.  Finally, a compensation screen showed each participant their compensation for that 
round as well as summary statistics of all participants’ compensation for that round. 
3.6 COMPENSATION CALCULATION 
Each round, participants started with 750 experimental dollars (E$750).  For each pair, 
each participant’s (i.e., both the Initial Checker’s and Final Checker’s) payoff was reduced by (1) 
E$67.50/minute the Initial Checker spent on either procedure and the difficulty assessment and (2) 
the square of the Initial Checker’s estimate error for each marble color (i.e., Color 1 and Color 2). 
  
                                                          
10 Giving all participants the same time/opportunities to perform work eliminates differences in 
understanding/training about the task.   
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Payoff for round = E$750 
   –E$67.50 x (# Minutes Initial Checker Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –(Initial Checker’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Initial Checker’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
The payoff function is designed to capture both the cost and benefit of performing 
additional work.  The cost of is the reduction in payoff per minute (or fraction thereof) of 
performing any additional work.  The benefit is the potential reduction in estimate error.  The 
estimate error for each color is squared to make a small estimate error costly but a larger estimate 
error significantly costlier.  In the natural setting, small errors may not be penalized, but large 
errors can be very costly.  The estimate error for each color is separated so that Procedure II, 
drawing a sample of marbles to determine the ratio of the colored marbles, has value. 
3.7 MANIPULATIONS 
Both experimental manipulations occurred in “Stage 2: Evaluation” and only on the Final 
Checkers.  That is, all Initial Checkers saw the same screens with no manipulations.  The first 
construct manipulation is whether evaluators focus more on quantity of work performed by 
evaluatees.  To operationalize this construct, I either did or did not display prompts to Final 
Checkers stating, (1) “Additional work can make the Initial Checker’s guess better” which was 
displayed before the “Initial Checker work summary screen,” and (2) “Remember, to get the most 
money, make sure the Initial Checker did enough work to correctly guess each marble color” 
which was displayed after the “Initial Checker work summary screen” (i.e., before the “evaluation 
screen”).  (See Appendix C for screenshots of the manipulations.) 
The second construct manipulation is whether evaluators document their initial assessment 
of the evaluatee’s judgment before conversing with them.  To operationalize this construct, I 
simply changed whether Final Checkers could or could not physically move sliders on a Likert 
scale to record their assessment of the Initial Checker’s pre-evaluation work on the “evaluation 
screen” the first time the Final Checker saw this screen (i.e. before chatting with Initial Checkers).  
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All Final Checkers could move the sliders the second time they saw the “evaluation screen” (i.e. 
after chatting with evaluatees).  (See Appendix C for screenshots of the manipulations.)  
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IV. RESULTS 
4.1 MANIPULATION CHECK 
Per predictions from confirmation bias theories, when evaluators are more focused on the 
quantity of work performed by evaluatees, the evaluators should, naturally, distrust the sufficiency 
and appropriateness of the work performed by evaluatees.  As such, to determine if the prompts 
for evaluators to focus more on the quantity of work performed by evaluatees successfully caused 
evaluators to distrust evaluatees’ work, I analyzed evaluators’ average response to the following 
post-experimental question, “In general, I trusted the [evaluatee’s] work” using a Likert scale 
ranging from “Strongly Disagree” (0) to “Strongly Agree” (100).  Evaluators given the prompts to 
focus more on the quantity of work performed by evaluatees trust their work marginally less (70.05 
vs. 59.79, F1,36=2.48, p=0.06 one-tailed).  Moreover, evaluatees (on whom no experimental 
manipulations occurred) felt their work was trusted marginally less when answering the question, 
“In general, the [evaluator] trusted my work,” (71.29 vs. 61.89, F1,36=2.60, p=0.06 one-tailed).  
While each individual result is only marginally significant, since they are collected from two 
different groups of participants (i.e., evaluators and evaluatees), when taken together, these results 
suggest a successful manipulation. 
4.2 EVALUATOR RESULTS (H1) 
H1 hypothesizes that if evaluators are more focused on the quantity of evaluatees’ work 
performed and document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing 
with them, evaluators will request greater amounts of the procedure they rate as more diagnostic.  
Results show that evaluators rate Procedure II (i.e., drawing marbles) as more diagnostic than 
Procedure I (i.e., view images of the filled/empty jar and its dimensions) (55.43 vs. 45.40, t40=5.04, 
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p<0.01 two-tailed).11  Therefore, the dependent variable for H1 is the additional amount of 
Procedure II requested by evaluators (Additional Procedure II Work Requested) calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50). 
 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100%. 
Figure 1 and Table 1 present the analysis for the effects of Quantity Focus (Lower vs. 
Higher) and Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) on Additional Procedure II Work 
Requested.  To test H1 directly, I use a repeated measures ANCOVA to control for the amount of 
Procedure II the evaluatee performed before the evaluation (Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed).  The ANCOVA with predicted linear contrast weights of -1 (Quantity Focus 
Lower/Document Initial Assessment is No), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment is No), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment is Yes), 3 (Quantity 
Focus Higher/Document Initial Assessment is Yes) is significant (F1,36=5.10, p=0.03 two-tailed).  
Simple main effects support this pattern of results.  When the Quantity Focus is higher, there is a 
significant increase between Document Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=3.90, p=0.03 one-
tailed).  Alternatively, when the Quantity Focus is lower, there is no difference between Document 
Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=2.68, p=0.11 two-tailed).  When Document Initial Assessment 
is Yes, there is a significant increase between Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher (F1,36=7.49, p<0.01 
one-tailed).  Alternatively, when Document Initial Assessment is No, there is no difference between 
Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher (F1,36=0.83, p=0.37 two-tailed).  These results support H1. 
                                                          
11 Results show that evaluatees also rate Procedure II as more effective than Procedure I (53.65 vs. 49.18, t40=2.12, 
p=0.04 two-tailed). 
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To verify that evaluators who are focused on quantity of evaluatees’ work performed and 
document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them only 
request greater amounts of the procedure they rate as more diagnostic, I perform the same analysis 
as above for the additional amount of Procedure I requested by evaluators (Additional Procedure 
I Work Requested) calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Figure 2 and Table 2 present the analysis for the effects of Quantity Focus (Lower vs. 
Higher) and Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) on Additional Procedure I Work Requested.  
To test directly, I use a repeated measures ANCOVA to control for the amount of Procedure I the 
evaluatee performed before the evaluation (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed).  The 
same predicted linear contrast is used with weights of -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial 
Assessment is No), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial Assessment is No), -1 (Quantity 
Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment is Yes), 3 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment is Yes) and is not significant (F1,36=1.05, p=0.31 two-tailed).   All simple main effects 
are also not significant (all F1,36≤2.83, all p≥0.10 two-tailed).  These results also support H1. 
4.3 EVALUATEE RESULTS (H2a & H2b) 
4.3.1. Evaluatee’s Post-Evaluation Work Performed (H2a).  H2a hypothesizes that when 
evaluators are more focused on the quantity of evaluatees’ work performed and document their 
initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them, evaluatees will 
perform greater amounts of the procedure the evaluators rate as more diagnostic after the 
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evaluation.  The dependent variable of interest is the time (seconds) evaluatees spent on Procedure 
II after the evaluation (Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed).   
Table 3 and Figure 3 present the analysis for the effects of Quantity Focus (Lower vs. 
Higher) and Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) on Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed.  To test H2a directly, I use a repeated measures ANOVA with the same predicted linear 
contrast weights as H1 (-1, -1, -1, 3) which is significant (F1,36=4.40, p=0.04 two-tailed).  Simple 
main effects support this pattern of results.  When the Quantity Focus is higher, there is a 
significant increase between Document Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=3.18, p=0.04 one-
tailed).  Alternatively, when the Quantity Focus is lower, there is no difference between Document 
Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=0.03, p=0.87 two-tailed).  When Document Initial Assessment 
is Yes, there is a significant increase between Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher (F1,36=2.98, p=0.05 
one-tailed).  Alternatively, when Document Initial Assessment is No, there is no difference between 
Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher (F1,36=0.00, p=0.95 two-tailed).  These results support H2a.12 
To verify that evaluatees only perform greater amounts of Procedure II during the post-
inspection period, I perform the same analysis as above for the additional amount of Procedure I 
performed by evaluatees (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed) which is the time 
(seconds) evaluatees spent on Procedure I after the evaluation.  Figure 4 and Table 4 present the 
analysis for the effects of Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) and Document Initial Assessment 
(No vs. Yes) on Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed.  I use a repeated measures ANOVA 
with the same predicted linear contrast weights as H2a (-1, -1, -1, 3) which is not significant 
                                                          
12 An alternative explanation could be that evaluatees perform greater amounts of Procedure II because evaluators are 
more persuasive during the chat.  To test this possibility, I analyze the chat data to determine if it mimics the predicted 
pattern of results.  More specifically, I test (1) the aggregate length of evaluators’ comments, (2) the count of 
evaluators’ comments, (3) the aggregate length of the evaluators’ plus evaluatees’ comments, (4) if the evaluator is 
more likely to speak first, and (5) if the evaluator is more likely to speak most.  I use a repeated measures ANOVA 
with the same predicted linear contrast weights as H2a and H2b (-1, -1, -1, 3).  None are significant (all p≥0.18 two-
tailed). 
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(F1,36=0.03, p=0.87 two-tailed).  All simple main effects are also not significant (all F1,36≤2.24, all 
p≥0.14 two-tailed).  These results also support H2a. 
4.3.2. Evaluatee’s Pre-Evaluation Work Performed (H2b).  H2b hypothesizes that when 
evaluators are more focused on the quantity of evaluatees’ work performed and document their 
initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them, evaluatees will learn, 
over time, to perform greater amounts of the procedure the evaluators rate as more effective before 
the evaluation.  The dependent variable of interest is the time (seconds) evaluatees spent on 
Procedure II before the evaluation (Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed). 
Table 5 and Figure 5 present the analysis for the effects of Quantity Focus (Lower vs. 
Higher) and Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) on Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed.  To test H2b directly, I use a repeated measures ANOVA with the same predicted 
linear contrast weights as H1 and H2a (-1, -1, -1, 3) which is significant (F1,36=11.39, p<0.01 two-
tailed).  Simple main effects support this pattern of results.  When the Quantity Focus is higher, 
there is a significant increase between Document Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=9.62, p<0.01 
one-tailed).  Alternatively, when the Quantity Focus is lower, there is no difference between 
Document Initial Assessment No vs. Yes (F1,36=0.10, p=0.75 two-tailed).  When Document Initial 
Assessment is Yes, there is a significant increase between Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher 
(F1,36=8.65, p<0.01 one-tailed).  Alternatively, when Document Initial Assessment is No, there is 
no difference between Quantity Focus Lower vs. Higher (F1,36=0.31, p=0.58 two-tailed).  These 
results support H2b. 
To verify that evaluatees only perform greater amounts of Procedure II, I perform the same 
analysis as above for the amount of Procedure I performed by evaluatees before the inspection 
(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed) which is the time (seconds) evaluatees spent on 
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Procedure I before the evaluation.  Figure 6 and Table 6 present the analysis for the effects of 
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) and Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) on Pre-
Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed.  I use a repeated measures ANOVA with the same 
predicted linear contrast weights as H2b (-1, -1, -1, 3) which is not significant (F1,36=1.32, p=0.26 
two-tailed).  All simple main effects are also insignificant (all F1,36≤1.47, all p≥0.23 two-tailed).  
These results also support H2b. 
4.4 DECISION QUALITY (H3) & RESEARCH QUESTION (RQ) RESULTS  
4.4.1. Decision Quality (H3).  H3 hypothesizes that more work will improve decision 
quality.  To test this hypothesis, I separately analyze the effects of the (1) evaluatees’ pre-
evaluation work performed on the evaluatees’ pre-evaluation estimate error and profit and (2) 
evaluatees’ post-evaluation work performed on the change in evaluatees’ estimate error and 
profit.13  This approach determines whether additional work after the evaluation is incrementally 
beneficial.  The dependent variables of interest are evaluatees’ pre-evaluation estimate error (Pre-
Evaluation Estimate Error), change in evaluatees’ estimate error (ΔEstimate Error), the pre-
evaluation profit (Pre-Evaluation Profit), and the change in profit (ΔProfit). These variables are 
calculated as follows: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error – Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
where: 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error =  
 |Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Final Estimate Error =  
 |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2|14 
                                                          
13Final Estimate Error         = Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error               + ΔEstimate Error 
   Final Profit          = Pre-Evaluation Profit                + ΔProfit 
   Total Procedure I Work Performed  = Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed  + Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed 
   Total Procedure II Work Performed = Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed 
14 Absolute value is used to minimize the effects of outliers.  See footnote 15 and 16 for additional information 
regarding outliers. 
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Final Profit and Pre-Evaluation Profit are calculated after and before the evaluation, respectively, using the payoff 
structure described in section 3.6 Compensation Calculation.  Recall that both the evaluatee and evaluator 
share the exact same payoff.   
Descriptive statistics and graphs are provided for all four dependent variables of interest 
across all non-practice periods by experimental condition.  These descriptive statistics include: 
• Table/Figure 7: Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
• Table/Figure 8: ΔEstimate Error  
• Table/Figure 9: Pre-Evaluation Profit (excluding outliers)15 
• Table/Figure 10: ΔProfit (excluding outliers)16 
Additionally, since each period participants are given a different shaped/sized jar, to offer 
more standardized descriptive statistics and graphs, each of the four dependent variables of interest 
are scaled by Difficulty Assessment.  Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the 
following question which is asked at the beginning of each period about the new jar, “On a scale 
from 1 to 100, how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this jar?”  These scaled 
dependent variables are presented for all non-practice periods and experimental conditions.  These 
descriptive statistics include: 
• Table/Figure 11: Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
• Table/Figure 12: ΔEstimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
• Table/Figure 13: Pre-Evaluation Profit/Difficulty Assessment (excluding 
outliers)17 
• Table/Figure 14: ΔProfit/Difficulty Assessment (excluding outliers)18 
                                                          
15 Observations are removed if Pre-Evaluation Profit is more than five standard deviations from the mean Pre-
Evaluation Profit.  Two outliers are removed.  The first is 14.3 standard deviations from the mean and the second is 
8.5 standard deviations from the mean.  The reason for these large deviations is a greater than average estimate error 
which, by construction of the payoff function, is squared (see additional details regarding the payoff function in 
section 3.6 Compensation Calculation). 
16 Observations are removed if ΔProfit is more than five standard deviations from the mean ΔProfit.  One outlier is 
removed which is 13 standard deviations from the mean.  This outlier is also one of the two outliers for Pre-
Evaluation Profit (see footnote 14).  The reason for this large deviation is a greater than average estimate error 
which, by construction of the payoff function, is squared (see additional details regarding the payoff function in 
section 3.6 Compensation Calculation). 
17 See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers. 
18 See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers. 
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To address H3 directly, I use regression analyses.  The independent variables of interest 
for H3 are the time (seconds) evaluatees spent on Procedure I and Procedure II both before and 
after the evaluation (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed, Pre-Evaluation Procedure II 
Work Performed, Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed, and Post-Evaluation Procedure 
II Work Performed).  
To test the effects of pre-evaluation work performed on pre-evaluation estimate error and 
profit, I estimate the following equation using OLS regression and clustering error terms by 
evaluatee: 
      DVit = β0 + β1(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed)it + β2(Pre-Evaluation Procedure 
II Work Performed)it + ∑kβk(Controls)it + εit            (1/2) 
where DVit is either Pre-Evaluation Estimate Errorit (equation 1) or Pre-Evaluation Profitit 
(equation 2), i indexes individual evaluatees, and t indexes each period.  Control variables are 
defined in the Table 15 and 16 footnotes.   
Table 15 column 1 shows that before the evaluation, time spent on Procedure I does not 
reduce estimate error but time spent on Procedure II does.  The coefficient for Pre-Evaluation 
Procedure I Work Performed is not significant (β=-0.04, p=0.14 one-tailed) while the coefficient 
for Pre- Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is negative and significant (β=-0.10, p=0.01 
one-tailed).  Similarly, Table 16 column 1 shows that before the evaluation, time spent on 
Procedure I does not increase profit but time spent on Procedure II does.  The coefficient for Pre-
Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is not significant (β=0.53, p=0.38 one-tailed) while the 
coefficient for Pre- Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is positive and marginally 
significant (β=3.11, p=0.06 one-tailed).  These results partially support H3 since only Procedure 
II, but not Procedure I, improves estimate accuracy and profit in the pre-evaluation period. 
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To test the effects of post-evaluation work on changes in estimate error and profit, I 
estimate the following equation using OLS regression and clustering error terms by evaluatee: 
      DVit = β0 + β1(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed)it +  
β2(Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed)it + ∑kβk(Controls)it+ εit      (3/4) 
where DVit is either ΔEstimate Errorit (equation 3) or ΔProfitit (equation 4), i indexes individual 
evaluatees, and t indexes each period.  Control variables are defined in the Table 17 and 18 
footnotes.   
Table 17 column 1 shows that after the evaluation, the additional time evaluatees spent on 
Procedure I incrementally reduces estimate error but additional time spent on Procedure II does 
not.  The coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is negative and significant 
(β=-0.09, p=0.03 one-tailed) while the coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed is not significant (β=-0.02, p=0.31 one-tailed).  Similarly, Table 18 column 1 shows 
that before the evaluation, time spent on Procedure I does increase profit but time spent on 
Procedure II does not.  The coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is 
positive and marginally significant (β=2.67, p=0.10 one-tailed) while the coefficient for Pre- 
Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is not significant (β=-1.58, p=0.22 one-tailed).  These 
results also partially support H3 since only Procedure I, but not Procedure II, improves estimate 
accuracy and profit in the post-evaluation period. 
4.4.2. Decision Quality (RQ).  The research question asks whether combining procedures 
of differently-rated diagnosticities improve overall decision quality on an ill-structured problem.  
To answer this question, I further interpret the H1-H3 results and perform additional analyses on 
subsets of the data related to the effects of work performed before and after the evaluation on 
decision quality. 
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Recall that results for H1 [H2a/b] show that evaluators [evaluatees] do not simply request 
[perform] more of all procedures when evaluators are more focused on the quantity of work 
performed and document their initial assessment of the evaluatee’s judgment before conversing 
with them, but specifically they request [perform] more of Procedure II.  However, it is unclear if 
evaluators [evaluatees] should always request [perform] Procedure II.  For further insight, I further 
interpret the results for H3. 
H3 results show that before the evaluation, Procedure II work performed improves the 
estimate accuracy and profit while Procedure I does not.  However, the reverse is true after the 
evaluation.  These results suggest that complementing the pre-evaluation Procedure II evidence 
with post-evaluation Procedure I evidence improves decision quality more.  This supports the 
concept of “evidentiary triangulation” where gathering “mutually reinforcing” evidence from 
different sources is superior to relying on a single source (Bell et al. 1997, Bell et al. 2005, Trotman 
and Wright 2012).  As a supplemental test, I also examine whether evaluatees, over time, 
understand this benefit of combining procedures of differently-rated diagnosticities to improve 
overall decision quality. 
Results show that, over time, evaluatees do seem to learn that complementing the pre-
evaluation Procedure II evidence with post-evaluation Procedure I evidence improves decision 
quality more.  Table 15 column 2 and 3 partition the pre-evaluation results for estimate error in 
column 1 at Period 5 (i.e., Period<=5 and Period>5) and reperform that analysis on each subset.  
When Period<=5, the coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is negative and 
significant (β=-0.07, p=0.05 one-tailed) while the coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure II 
Work Performed is not significant (β=-0.07, p=0.19 one-tailed).  However, when Period>5, the 
reverse is true.  The coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is not significant 
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(β=-0.01, p=0.44 one-tailed) while the coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed is negative and significant (β=-0.15, p<0.01 one-tailed).  Similarly, Table 16 column 2 
and 3 partition the pre-evaluation results for profit in column 1 at Period 5 and reperform that 
analysis on each subset.  When Period<=5, neither the coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure I 
Work Performed nor Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is significant (β=1.86, p=0.16 
one-tailed; β=1.54, p=0.36 one-tailed).  However, when Period>5, the coefficient for Pre-
Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is not significant (β=-1.03, p=0.33 one-tailed) while the 
coefficient for Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is positive and significant (β=5.01, 
p<0.01 one-tailed).  That is, performing Procedure II before the evaluation is more valuable than 
performing Procedure I and, over time, evaluatees seem to learn this benefit. 
Next, I similarly partition the post-evaluation results and reperform those analyses for 
additional evidence that evaluatees learn to complement pre-evaluation Procedure II evidence with 
post-evaluation Procedure I evidence to improve their decision quality more.  Table 17 column 2 
and 3 partition the post-evaluation results for changes in estimate error in column 1 at Period 5. 
When Period<=5, neither the coefficients for Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed nor 
Procedure II Work Performed is significant (β=-0.07, p=0.11 one-tailed; β=0.06, p=0.11 one-
tailed).  However, when Period>5, the coefficients for both Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work 
Performed and Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed are negative and significant (β=-
0.18, p<0.01 one-tailed; β=-0.16, p=0.01 one-tailed).19  Similarly, Table 18 column 2 and 3 
partition the post-evaluation results for changes in profit in column 1 at Period 5. When Period<=5, 
the coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is not significant (β=-0.02, 
                                                          
19 Period 5 is chosen because this is the only period that the starting estimate, by design, was correct.  That is, the 
number of each colored marble in the starting estimate was the actual number of each colored marble in the jar.  For 
additional information regarding the stating estimate, see footnote 8. 
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p=0.50 one-tailed) while the coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is 
negative and significant (β=-4.35, p=0.04 one-tailed).  However, when Period>5, the coefficients 
for both Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed and Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work 
Performed are positive and significant (β=7.46, p<0.01 one-tailed; β=3.00, p=0.02 one-tailed).  
Moreover, the coefficient for Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is more than double 
that of Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed (β=7.46 vs. β=3.00).  That is, performing 
Procedure I after the evaluation is significantly more valuable than performing Procedure II and, 
over time, evaluatees seem to learn this benefit.  Taken together, these results in tables 15-18 
support the idea that evaluatees seem to learn, over time, to perform Procedure II before the 
evaluation but complement that evidence with Procedure I evidence after the evaluation to improve 
their decision quality more. 
To further investigate this possibility, I develop the measures Procedure I Follow and 
Procedure II Follow to describe how much the evaluatee does or does not follow their evaluator’s 
request for additional work.  I then reperform the analysis in Table 16 and 18 using these variables 
as covariates to determine whether evaluatees who follow evaluators’ requests improve their 
estimate accuracy and profit.   
To develop the Procedure I Follow and Procedure II Follow measures, I compare the 
amount of each procedure requested by the evaluator after the evaluation, Additional Procedure I 
Work Requested and Additional Procedure II Work Requested (see Appendix A for variable 
definitions or section 4.2 Evaluator Results for additional discussion of these variables) with the 
amount of each procedure actually performed by the evaluatee after the evaluation.  First, I 
calculate Additional Procedure I Work Performed and Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
as follows: 
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Additional Procedure I Work Performed = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
 (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Multiplying by 50 allows for a direct comparison with Additional Procedure I Work 
Requested and Additional Procedure II Work Requested since 50 is the midpoint of those scales 
representing evaluators requesting evaluatees to perform double the amount of work (see 
Appendix A for variable definitions or section 4.2 Evaluator Results for additional discussion of 
these variables).   
To determine how much evaluatees follow evaluators’ requests, I simply subtract the two 
variables. 
Procedure I Follow = 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
Procedure II Follow = 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
Based on these calculations, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who 
did exactly (less than) [more than] the amount of additional work requested by the evaluator of 
that procedure.  Said alternatively, the more positive the amount, the less an evaluatee obeys their 
evaluator.  Descriptive statistics and graphs across all non-practice periods and experimental 
conditions are provided for Procedure I Follow and Procedure II Follow in Figure 15/Table 19 
and Figure 16/Table 20, respectively. 
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I then re-estimate equations 3 and 4 with Procedure I Follow and Procedure II Follow as 
covariates using OLS regression and clustering error terms by evaluatee: 
      DVit = β0 + β1(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed)it +  
β2(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed)it + 
β3(Procedure I Follow)it + β4(Procedure II Follow)it +  
β5(Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed)it*(Procedure I Follow)it +  
β6(Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed)it*(Procedure II Follow)it +  
∑kβk(Controls)it+ εit             (5/6) 
where DVit is either ΔEstimate Errorit (equation 5) or ΔProfitit (equation 6), i indexes individual 
evaluatees, and t indexes each period.  Control variables are defined in the Table 21 and 22 
footnotes.   
The independent variables of interest in these tables are the main effects of Procedure I 
Follow and Procedure II Follow as well as each of their interactive effects with Pre-Evaluation 
Procedure II Work Performed.  Procedure I Follow and Procedure II Follow are interacted with 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed because, as results to H1 and H2b of this study 
show, evaluators seem to over-request Procedure II (i.e., H1) even after evaluatees may have 
performed sufficient amounts of Procedure II before the evaluation (i.e., H2b).  Therefore, these 
interaction terms offer insight about the decision quality effects of evaluatees following (or not 
following) evaluators’ requests for additional work after the evaluation contingent on the amount 
of Procedure II already performed by an evaluatee before the evaluation. 
Results do offer some partial, but mixed, evidence that evaluatees who follow evaluators’ 
requests less improve decision quality more.  Table 21 column 1 which is the results for all 
conditions combined does not offer any statistically significant coefficients for either main effect 
of Procedure I Follow or Procedure II Follow or their interactions with Pre-Evaluation Procedure 
II Work Performed.  However, it is more useful to partition the data to investigate the settings 
where not following an evaluator’s requests should improve decision quality more.  Based on the 
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prior findings of this study (i.e., H1, H2a, and H2b), the condition where evaluators may over-
request and evaluatees over-perform Procedure II is when evaluators focus more on the quantity 
of evaluatees’ work performed and document their initial assessment of the evaluatees’ judgment 
before conversing with them.  Therefore, the columns 2 and 3 of Table 21 perform the same 
regression analyses as column 1 for that specific experimental condition and all remaining 
conditions separately.  Table 21 column 3 shows that for that specific experimental condition of 
interest, the coefficient for Procedure II Follow is positive and marginally significant (β=0.41, 
p=0.08 two-tailed).  Recall that, based on the calculation of Procedure II Follow, the more positive 
the amount, the less an evaluatee follows their evaluator’s request.  Therefore, the (marginally) 
positive main effect for Procedure II Follow implies that when evaluatees follow evaluators’ 
requests less, their estimate error increases.  However, and more interestingly, the coefficient for 
the interaction of Procedure II Follow and Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is 
negative and significant (β=-0.01, p=0.02 two-tailed).  This result implies that when evaluatees 
spend more time performing Procedure II before the evaluation, evaluatees who follow evaluators’ 
requests less after the evaluation actually decrease their estimate error.  None of the above results 
appear in column 2.  This lack of results may indicate that to investigate the main and interactive 
effects of Procedure I Follow and Procedure II Follow, it is important to identify experimental 
conditions where such results of interest are more likely to occur.  Results for profit are similar.  
Table 22 column 3 shows coefficient for Procedure II Follow is negative but not significant at 
conventional levels (β=-19.73, p=0.13 two-tailed).  However, the coefficient for the interaction of 
Procedure II Follow and Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is positive and significant 
(β=0.30, p=0.03 two-tailed).  This second results implies that when evaluatees spend more time 
performing Procedure II before the evaluation, evaluatees who follow evaluators’ requests less 
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after the evaluation increase their profit more.  Table 22 column 1 and 2 do not have statistically 
significant results for the independent variables of interest underscoring the importance of 
identifying and examining experimental conditions where such results are more likely to occur. 
These H3 and RQ results offer potentially important insights about third-party judgment 
evaluations and their effects on decision quality on ill-structured problems.  First, performing 
additional work requested by evaluators can improve decision quality on these problems.  
However, only performing additional work rated as more diagnostic by evaluators may not 
improve decision quality as much as performing a combination of procedures of differently-rated 
diagnosticities.  That is, as the marginal effectiveness of the procedure rated as more diagnostic 
decreases, it may be better to perform the procedure rated as less diagnostic to improve decision 
quality.  Second, evaluators fully incentivized to improve decision quality may be inadvertently 
diverting evaluatees’ efforts towards procedures that do not do so.  Since evaluatees’ and 
evaluators’ incentives are exactly aligned in my task, evaluators presumably request procedures 
they truly believe will improve their outcome.  However, by over-requesting Procedure II, 
evaluators miss the benefits of complementing that evidence with Procedure I evidence.  In 
practice, evaluatees often claim that some evaluators request unnecessary additional work.  These 
evaluators insist that they are only trying to improve decision quality.  Based upon my results, it 
may be that both are actually right.  
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V. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I explore the process of third-party judgment evaluations on ill-structured 
problems and the interactions between evaluatees and their evaluators.  While several professions 
outside accounting can benefit from this research, accounting is the most natural setting to start 
studying the process of third-party judgment evaluations with ill-structured problems due to the 
wide variety of such evaluations that occur in various accounting settings (e.g., SEC 2008).  For 
example, such accounting third-party judgment evaluations include external auditors’ evaluation 
of managements’ assertions, external auditors’ evaluation of internal auditors’ work, audit firms’ 
internal quality reviews, audit firms’ peer audit quality reviews, SEC investigations, IRS audits, 
and PCAOB audit inspections.  This last type of third-party judgment evaluation is the most 
important since the PCAOB is a new type of oversight where subjective judgment is guaranteed 
to be evaluated by a regulatory third party at specific time intervals (e.g., Kinney 2005, Gradison 
and Boster 2010, Peecher et al. 2013).  While accounting is the only profession that currently faces 
such oversight, as professions continue to increase in complexity, the problems to be solved 
become more ill-structured, and, thus, the potential of bad judgment increases, other professions 
could face similar regulation.  Therefore, this study is a “first step” to open a stream of literature 
on this important topic. 
I find that, despite all evaluators and evaluatees having the same incentives, training, and 
information, psychological factors can distort these economic factors causing similar evaluators 
and evaluatees to behave differently and, in turn, significantly affect evaluatees’ decision quality 
on an ill-structured problem.  First, evaluators can be induced to distrust evaluatees’ work.  A 
prompt that focuses evaluators on the quantity of work performed causes them to believe that 
evaluatees’ work performed is insufficient and/or inappropriate.  These evaluators initially want 
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more work performed by the evaluatees and, more specifically, more of the type of work they (i.e., 
the evaluators) rate as more diagnostic or “better.”  However, only if these prompted evaluators 
also document their initial assessment of evaluatees’ judgment before conversing with them will 
the evaluators actually request greater amounts of such work.  Evaluators’ behavior is consistent 
with confirmation bias theories.  I also find that evaluatees generally do perform the additional 
work requested by evaluators after the evaluation and, over time, learn to perform some of it before 
the evaluation.  Evaluatees’ behavior is consistent with learning theories.  Last, I find that any 
additional work can improve decision quality on the ill-structured problem but that a combination 
of procedures of differently-rated diagnosticities improves overall decision quality more.  
However, evaluators may over-request and evaluatees over-perform the procedure they (i.e., the 
evaluators) rate as more diagnostic and, thus, not improve overall decision quality as much as 
possible.  Therefore, while third-party judgment evaluations do seem to improve overall decision 
quality on ill-structured problems, they may not do so to the greatest extent possible.   
This research contributes to both the accounting and psychology literature as well as to 
practice.  For accounting literature, I am starting a stream of literature to study the effects of third-
party evaluations of judgments on decision quality of ill-structured problems.  As discussed above, 
given the changing landscape of the accounting profession including its regulation (e.g., Gradison 
and Boster 2010, Peecher et al. 2013) and the increasingly complex judgments made in accounting 
due to the increasingly ill-structured problems accountants encounter (e.g., Griffith et al. 2015), it 
is ever more important to understand how such judgments are evaluated by third parties and how 
this process can be improved.  Additionally, from a methodological standpoint, I develop a flexible 
experimental framework to examine this process of third-party judgment evaluations and the 
interactions between evaluators and evaluatees.  This framework facilitates research to peer inside 
57 
the “black box” of third-party judgment evaluations to contextualize better the prior archival 
results and derive new insights.  More specifically, a strong benefit of this experimental framework 
is that I can directly manipulate the evaluator’s behavior making it especially useful for studying 
evaluators from U.S. governmental entities who are, currently, unexaminable (e.g., PCAOB, IRS, 
SEC).  A strength of abstract experimental frameworks is their ability to generalize to many setting 
with only minor adjustments (e.g., Friedman and Sunder 1994).  As such, my framework can 
potentially address questions about third-party judgment evaluations on ill-structured problems in 
accounting areas as disparate as, for example, tax (e.g., IRS reviewing a tax return) or financial 
accounting (e.g., bank inspectors oversight of capital requirement calculations).   
Regarding psychology literature, this study has potential implications for confirmation bias 
theories.  First, this study shows that confirmation bias is not just a unidirectional phenomenon 
where an internal cognition affects external behavior but, instead, can be a circular phenomenon 
where that external behavior can then affect internal cognition.  That is, while the experimental 
manipulations only affect evaluators original cognition, once evaluators act on this cognition, they 
then allow these previous actions to affect their subsequent cognitions.  Second, the results suggest 
that evaluators engage in a heuristic that I deem “attribute complement” where they conflate the 
concept of “more work” with “better procedures” and increase the two in tandem.  More 
specifically, when evaluators do request additional work, they only request more of the procedure 
they deem “better.”  Third, this study shows that only minimal circumstances are necessary to 
activate the psychological need for behavioral consistency underpinning confirmation bias.  That 
is, even when economic costs of changing behavior are essentially zero, psychological costs appear 
to be much higher.  Fourth, this study shows that the effects of confirmation bias may not be 
mitigated by (1) incentives or (2) another party without such bias.  That is, equalizing incentives 
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among evaluators and evaluatees does not mitigate evaluators’ confirmation bias.  Moreover, even 
though the ultimate decisions are made by evaluatees, evaluatees do not fully mitigate the effects 
of evaluators’ confirmation bias on evaluators’ behavior and, in turn, evaluatees’ own behavior. 
These results also offer important insights for practice.  First, third-party judgment 
evaluations do seem to improve decision quality on ill-structured problems and some of this benefit 
may be gained from the additional work performed by evaluatees in anticipation of the evaluation.  
Additionally, the results show that evaluators who are correctly incentivized and motivated may 
still inadvertently request additional work that is less effective at improving decision quality on 
ill-structured problems.  In my experiment, the evaluators do not seem to understand the benefit 
of gathering evidence from different sources (e.g., Bell et al. 2005).  However, the evaluatees 
performing the actual work and making the decision do show evidence of understanding this 
concept.  These results of improving decision quality by combining procedures of differently-rated 
diagnosticities supports such conjectures made by current commentaries and monographs (Bell et 
al. 1997, Bell et al. 2005, Glover et al. 2015, Knechel 2016).  As such, this study can help inform 
evaluatees and evaluators about some of the costs and benefits of third-party judgment evaluations 
on decision quality of ill-structured problems.  For example, if initial assessments are formalized 
in practice, the evaluators will likely be less willing to change or consider evaluatees’ reasoned 
judgment even if it would improve decision quality. 
My results are subject to limitations.  The main limitations are due to the deliberate 
experimental design choices made to more cleanly test the underlying theory and to draw clearer 
causal inferences about the process of third-party judgment evaluations with ill-structured 
problems.  First, I equalize the incentives, information, and training of both evaluators and 
evaluatees.  Future research can vary these elements to mimic specific real world settings and 
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determine their effects on the evaluations and decision quality.  Second, I also select a task that is 
ill-structured but also has a definitive correct answer.  While this choice offers strong experimental 
internal validity by allowing rank ordering of evaluatees’ performance on the ill-structured task, it 
may also limit external validity since most ill-structured problems in the real world do not have a 
“correct” answer.  Future research could determine if and how ill-structured problems with and 
without a correct answer affect these third-party judgment evaluations.  Third, I randomly assign 
individuals to roles.  However, different types of individuals likely self-select into different 
evaluator and evaluatee roles such as financial statement manger, audit senior, audit manager, and 
IRS/PCAOB inspector.  The effects of these personality differences could also be explored in 
future work.  Other such assumptions that future research can relax and investigate are the random 
pairing of evaluators with evaluatees each period and the lack of materiality levels to determine a 
negative outcome.  Beyond relaxing assumptions, future research could also examine whether 
most of the benefit of third-party judgment evaluations come from work performed by evaluatees 
in anticipation of them and, if so, whether random evaluations or evaluations that occur at longer 
time intervals are sufficient.  Other questions could include the effects of evaluator rotations, 
concurrent evaluations (e.g., Peecher et al. 2013), or various biases (e.g., in-group vs. out-group 
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FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
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FIGURE 2 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
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FIGURE 3 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
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FIGURE 4 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
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FIGURE 5 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
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Panel A: Predictions 
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FIGURE 6 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  







Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 7 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 7 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error= 






Post-Evaluation Changes in Estimate Error by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 8 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 8 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Change in the evaluatee’s combined “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after the 
evaluation, calculated as: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error–Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
where: 
Final Estimate Error is the evaluatee’s final “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after 
the evaluation, calculated as: 
Final Estimate Error = |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error= 






Pre-Evaluation Profit by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers)  
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 9 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 9 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
(Note: See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 






Post-Evaluation Change in Profit by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers) 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 10 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 10 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 






Pre-Evaluation Ratio of Estimate Error to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by Period and 
Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 11 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 11 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
 
where: 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error =  
|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 







Post-Evaluation Ratio of Change in Estimate Error to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by 
Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 12 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 12 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔEstimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
 
where: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error – Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
Final Estimate Error =  
|Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error =  
|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 







Pre-Evaluation Ratio of Profit to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by Period and Experimental 
Condition (Excluding Outliers) 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 13 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 13 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Profit/Difficulty Assessment 
(Note: See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 







Post-Evaluation Ratio of Change in Profit to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by Period and 
Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers) 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 14 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 14 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit /Difficulty Assessment  
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 






Procedure I Follow by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 15 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 15 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Procedure I Follow = Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
(Note: Based on this calculation, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less than) 
[more than] the amount of additional work requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure I Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 







Procedure II Follow by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: Lower Work Quantity Focus 
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FIGURE 16 (cont.) 
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FIGURE 16 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Procedure II Follow = Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
(Note: Based on this calculation, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less than) 
[more than] the amount of additional work requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 







Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H1 
Dependent Variable: Additional Procedure II Work Requested by Evaluators 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Marginal Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
Quantity 
Focus No Yes Overall
A 12.16 C 7.71 9.40
Lower 1.46 1.41 1.07
83 108 191
B 9.68 D 15.78 12.57
Higher 1.38 1.75 1.09
100 77 177
10.78 11.01 10.91




Panel B: Analysis of Covariance (Repeated Measures)  
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed 1 8.88 0.01 two-tailed
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 2.11 0.16 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 0.16 0.69 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x  Document Initial Assessment 1 6.59 0.01 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 2.11 0.02 two-tailed
Error 324  
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Table 1 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 5.10 0.03 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.83 0.37 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 7.49 < 0.01 one-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A -C ] 1 2.68 0.11 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B -D ] 1 3.90 0.03 one-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 





Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H1 
Dependent Variable: Additional Procedure I Work Requested by Evaluators 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Marginal Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
Quantity  
Focus No Yes Overall
A 8.69 C 6.93 7.60
Lower 1.25 1.20 0.91
83 108 191
B 11.09 D 6.67 9.00
Higher 1.18 1.40 0.92
100 77 177
10.02 6.83 8.26




Panel B: Analysis of Covariance (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed 1 0.22 0.64 two-tailed
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 0.37 0.55 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 2.78 0.10 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x  Document Initial Assessment 1 0.57 0.45 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 0.71 0.72 two-tailed
Error 317  
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Table 2 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 1.05 0.31 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.94 0.34 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 0.01 0.92 two-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A -C ] 1 0.51 0.48 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B -D ] 1 2.83 0.10 two-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H2a 
Dependent Variable: Additional Procedure II Work Performed by Evaluatees, Post-Evaluation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Raw Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
Quantity 
Focus No Yes Overall
A 10.91 C 12.41 11.76
Lower 15.69 21.72 19.30
83 108 191
B 11.34 D 22.42 16.16
Higher 23.23 31.88 27.80
100 77 177
11.14 16.58 13.88




Panel B: Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures)  
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 1.62 0.21 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 1.87 0.18 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x  Document Initial Assessment 1 1.39 0.25 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 3.94 < 0.01 two-tailed
Error 318  
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Table 3 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 4.40 0.04 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.00 0.95 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 2.98 0.05 one-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A -C ] 1 0.03 0.87 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B -D ] 1 3.18 0.04 one-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  





Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H2a 
Dependent Variable: Additional Procedure I Work Performed by Evaluatees, Post-Evaluation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Raw Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
Quantity 
Focus No Yes Overall
A 7.76 C 15.78 12.29
Lower 14.96 21.36 19.22
83 108 191
B 7.17 D 9.19 8.05
Higher 14.44 21.98 18.08
100 77 177
7.44 13.04 10.25




Panel B: Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures)  
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 0.76 0.39 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 1.69 0.20 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x  Document Initial Assessment 1 0.62 0.44 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 2.05 0.03 two-tailed
Error 318  
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 0.03 0.87 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.00 0.96 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 1.36 0.25 two-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A -C ] 1 2.24 0.14 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B -D ] 1 0.15 0.70 two-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  





Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H2b 
Dependent Variable: Procedure II Work Performed by Evaluatees, Pre-Evaluation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Raw Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
Quantity 
Focus No Yes Overall
A 44.47 C 41.20 42.59
Lower 26.51 39.68 34.65
83 112 195
B 38.10 D 76.23 55.16
Higher 34.46 45.21 43.85
100 81 181
40.99 55.90 48.64




Panel B: Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures)  
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 2.83 0.10 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 3.89 0.06 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x  Document Initial Assessment 1 6.09 0.02 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 5.74 < 0.01 two-tailed
Error 326  
111 
Table 5 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 11.39 < 0.01 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.31 0.58 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 8.65 < 0.01 one-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A-C] 1 0.10 0.75 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B-D] 1 9.62 < 0.01 one-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  





Descriptive Statistics and Test of Hypotheses for H2b 
Dependent Variable: Procedure I Work Performed by Evaluatees, Pre-Evaluation 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics [Raw Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
Quantity 
Focus No Yes Overall
A 48.17 C 51.55 50.11
Lower 29.94 33.17 31.80
83 112 195
B 52.65 D 38.59 46.36
Higher 35.88 52.43 44.48
100 81 181
50.62 46.11 48.31




Panel B: Analysis of Variance (Repeated Measures)  
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 1 0.12 0.73 two-tailed
Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 1 0.56 0.46 two-tailed
Quantity Focus x Document Initial Assessment 1 0.97 0.33 two-tailed
Subject 36
Period 10 3.83 0.00 two-tailed
Error 326  
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Table 6 (cont.) 
Panel C: Planned Contrast and Follow-up Tests of Simple Effects (Repeated Measures) 
Source of Variation DF F p-value
Planned Contrast (-1, -1, -1, 3)† 1 1.32 0.26 two-tailed
Simple Effect Comparison of:
   Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) given:
      Document Initial Assessment (No) [A -B ] 1 0.20 0.65 two-tailed
      Document Initial Assessment (Yes) [C -D ] 1 0.89 0.35 two-tailed
   Document Intitial Assessment (No vs. Yes) given:
      Quantity Focus Lower [A -C ] 1 0.02 0.88 two-tailed
      Quantity Focus Higher [B -D ] 1 1.47 0.23 two-tailed  
† Contrast Weights  
-1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Higher/Document Initial 
Assessment (No)), -1 (Quantity Focus Lower/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)), 3 (Quantity Focus 
Higher/Document Initial Assessment (Yes)).   
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work 
by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated 
by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of evaluatees’ work (by moving 
response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For 
manipulation screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  






Descriptive Statistics  
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error= 
|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
19.25 32.00 27.14 26.88 34.08 31.33 28.38 39.08 35.00 9.25 14.85 12.71 36.00 37.31 36.81 22.50 19.31 20.52 24.75 26.92 26.10 21.63 26.31 24.52 34.00 31.75 33.25 25.38 37.50 29.42 25.38 25.38 24.53 29.15 27.18
Lower n/a n/a n/a 11.89 20.58 18.55 23.42 11.05 16.68 12.52 15.91 15.34 4.71 5.05 5.55 20.09 14.37 16.30 14.89 9.71 11.69 13.73 15.25 14.37 11.40 25.21 20.79 24.60 17.19 21.61 12.89 8.39 12.67 12.89 12.89 16.52 16.97 16.89
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 4 12 8 8 83 112 195
30.00 26.89 28.53 30.30 26.89 28.68 32.40 35.00 33.63 11.60 12.56 12.05 46.40 22.89 35.26 22.80 21.22 22.05 24.10 31.67 27.68 38.20 21.89 30.47 15.60 21.89 18.58 17.80 17.80 17.80 17.80 27.45 24.54 26.15
Higher n/a n/a n/a 19.07 26.29 22.17 13.68 22.36 17.86 15.59 28.67 22.11 5.30 7.86 6.46 39.76 17.14 32.66 12.50 10.72 11.39 18.45 21.51 19.77 45.09 11.22 33.80 10.06 11.87 11.12 10.87 10.87 10.87 10.87 24.05 18.97 21.91
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 5 5 5 5 100 81 181
25.22 29.91 27.80 28.78 31.14 30.08 30.61 37.41 34.35 10.56 13.91 12.40 41.78 31.41 36.08 22.67 20.09 21.25 24.39 28.86 26.85 30.83 24.50 27.35 23.78 24.92 24.26 22.46 37.50 26.00 22.46 22.46 26.13 27.22 26.69
Overall n/a n/a n/a 16.76 22.63 20.09 18.11 16.53 17.08 14.05 21.50 18.62 5.04 6.28 5.93 32.11 16.81 25.08 13.19 9.93 11.43 16.06 17.74 16.94 34.67 20.40 27.53 19.78 13.79 17.27 12.29 8.39 13.03 12.29 12.29 20.97 17.94 19.45
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TABLE 8 
Descriptive Statistics  
Post-Evaluation Change in Estimate Error by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Change in the evaluatee’s combined “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after the evaluation, calculated as: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error–Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
where: 
Final Estimate Error is the evaluatee’s final “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after the evaluation, calculated as: 
Final Estimate Error = |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error= |Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
4.13 (3.15) (0.38) 0.50 (0.38) (0.05) (2.38) (5.46) (4.29) 0.38 0.62 0.52 (2.38) (4.92) (3.95) (2.88) (1.38) (1.95) 0.38 (2.31) (1.29) (1.25) (3.77) (2.81) (2.63) (8.50) (4.58) (2.25) (2.25) 0.00 0.00 (0.81) (2.81) (1.94)
Lower n/a n/a n/a 4.82 11.04 9.71 3.38 9.72 7.80 12.03 11.14 11.29 3.70 5.49 4.78 5.07 15.95 12.77 9.89 8.43 8.80 8.16 12.57 10.95 7.69 9.18 8.54 4.69 12.77 8.17 15.23 15.23 0.00 0.00 7.98 10.72 9.65
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 8 3 3 83 108 191
(7.90) 7.33 (0.68) (1.70) (2.78) (2.21) (6.90) (9.22) (8.00) (4.40) (0.78) (2.68) (16.50) (3.00) (10.11) 0.40 (1.56) (0.53) 13.30 (13.22) 0.74 5.40 1.22 3.42 (1.00) (6.40) (2.80) 5.80 5.80 (7.20) (7.20) (2.00) (2.99) (2.43)
Higher n/a n/a n/a 21.87 16.29 20.45 13.13 22.54 17.67 19.69 32.09 25.55 6.85 11.08 9.02 34.35 9.84 26.10 5.74 2.79 4.57 45.60 17.41 36.87 12.78 7.55 10.56 8.60 12.78 10.06 19.73 19.73 16.24 16.24 22.54 17.13 20.32
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 100 77 177
(2.56) 1.14 (0.53) (0.72) (1.36) (1.08) (4.89) (7.00) (6.05) (2.28) 0.05 (1.00) (10.22) (4.14) (6.87) (1.06) (1.45) (1.28) 7.56 (6.77) (0.32) 2.44 (1.73) 0.15 (1.72) (7.33) (3.59) 0.85 0.85 (4.50) (4.50) (1.46) (2.89) (2.18)
Overall n/a n/a n/a 17.34 14.09 15.54 9.86 15.78 13.29 16.44 21.60 19.24 6.04 8.03 7.21 26.22 13.53 20.19 7.78 6.60 7.06 34.23 15.36 26.27 11.06 8.73 9.94 6.99 12.00 9.14 16.78 16.78 12.83 12.83 17.48 13.71 15.69
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TABLE 9 
Descriptive Statistics  
Pre-Evaluation Profit by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers)  
Panel A: [Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the evaluation 
(Note: See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
380.03 (119.39) 70.86 (36.60) (173.70) (121.47) 118.61 (431.98) (222.23) 587.99 522.47 547.43 (550.92) (331.44) (415.05) 222.13 389.91 325.99 199.56 142.90 164.48 260.57 (237.51) (47.77) (330.99) (150.92) (270.96) 260.43 (18.73) 167.38 482.33 482.33 124.50 (33.77) 33.60
Lower n/a n/a n/a 251.08 979.28 811.93 874.08 445.26 625.31 404.53 814.05 727.97 55.01 106.82 94.70 844.84 616.98 700.10 572.85 348.75 441.36 445.96 443.26 433.93 545.97 1,894.98 1,523.27 1,335.05 584.65 1,111.45 266.98 359.41 315.41 32.51 32.51 691.99 879.12 806.69
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 4 12 3 3 83 112 195
(50.38) (220.60) (131.01) (59.08) (21.70) (41.38) (57.19) (415.74) (227.03) 561.82 514.12 539.22 (442.17) 97.32 (172.43) 253.94 331.74 290.80 65.97 (315.22) (114.59) 127.97 255.76 191.87 442.80 293.04 371.86 458.36 458.36 (208.72) (208.72) 102.03 57.63 81.94
Higher n/a n/a n/a 947.76 1,641.13 1,285.99 491.65 927.09 709.38 529.40 1,615.76 1,155.10 103.89 128.80 115.62 1,132.50 674.22 945.78 374.27 289.53 329.98 842.51 1,270.44 1,053.80 545.97 479.79 502.92 241.25 432.28 343.59 288.48 288.48 1,285.28 1,285.28 708.50 983.84 842.06
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 5 5 5 5 98 81 179
140.91 (160.80) (25.03) (49.09) (111.52) (83.43) 20.94 (425.34) (224.51) 573.45 519.05 543.53 (493.35) (156.04) (303.07) 239.80 366.11 309.27 125.34 (44.51) 31.92 190.37 (35.72) 62.83 98.89 156.43 123.02 336.56 (18.73) 252.96 50.43 50.43 112.34 4.59 56.73
Overall n/a n/a n/a 741.58 1,255.63 1,054.40 665.36 668.26 659.11 473.12 1,171.87 942.12 84.49 113.39 103.86 978.10 661.25 820.46 457.76 319.83 387.91 679.96 883.34 793.10 533.02 1,483.68 1,161.48 959.82 505.48 790.62 281.72 359.41 328.45 1,035.46 1,035.46 699.12 923.12 823.06
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TABLE 10 
Descriptive Statistics  
Post-Evaluation Change in Profit by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers) 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Error, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
(245.23) (14.76) (102.55) (49.53) (32.26) (38.84) 34.63 218.77 148.62 (41.40) (47.83) (45.38) 75.15 42.08 54.68 140.97 24.31 68.75 (110.00) 18.29 (30.58) 4.21 48.54 31.65 49.07 295.01 131.05 44.16 44.16 (24.10) (24.10) (10.31) 41.88 19.20
Lower n/a n/a n/a 266.76 360.69 340.76 90.53 431.01 338.24 278.68 425.96 380.06 54.70 126.53 103.26 221.46 592.69 477.71 473.25 259.87 349.69 251.80 462.39 393.13 122.96 434.68 345.17 261.13 399.72 318.80 295.33 295.33 23.28 23.28 259.52 403.15 348.24
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 8 3 3 83 108 191
273.53 (439.01) (63.99) (185.87) 197.63 (4.21) 128.93 469.76 290.38 31.45 (57.01) (10.45) 280.46 104.80 192.63 (58.04) (10.40) (35.48) 0.32 631.10 315.71 (323.69) (110.06) (222.50) 27.19 23.10 25.82 (221.92) (221.92) 573.94 573.94 32.88 93.46 59.54
Higher n/a n/a n/a 1,018.91 780.08 960.81 1,031.54 986.02 1,001.42 552.58 1,831.56 1,293.90 96.82 124.26 116.65 511.05 373.16 443.40 221.07 83.74 167.78 300.97 1,211.88 916.01 499.16 387.01 450.73 194.26 261.14 209.16 525.54 525.54 1,245.71 1,245.71 640.19 897.52 762.39
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 98 77 175
42.97 (188.31) (84.24) (125.27) 61.78 (22.39) 87.02 321.45 215.96 (0.93) (51.59) (28.79) 183.84 67.74 118.35 30.41 10.11 19.24 (51.59) 268.98 129.25 (177.95) (16.34) (89.07) 36.91 143.95 72.59 (58.18) (58.18) 349.68 349.68 13.07 63.35 38.49
Overall n/a n/a n/a 805.78 593.08 697.14 756.02 699.94 722.38 442.67 1,182.19 922.99 87.07 122.68 109.82 403.98 504.75 461.43 358.40 203.88 280.14 276.14 881.34 698.07 407.73 414.00 413.99 219.50 338.46 263.43 401.37 401.37 991.31 991.31 502.00 654.13 583.62
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TABLE 11 
Descriptive Statistics  
Pre-Evaluation Ratio of Estimate Error to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
 
where: 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error = |Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, 
how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this jar?” 
 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
0.32 0.52 0.44 0.59 0.51 0.54 0.63 0.69 0.67 0.15 0.26 0.22 0.75 0.82 0.79 0.50 0.35 0.41 0.43 0.87 0.70 0.44 0.74 0.63 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.46 0.68 0.53 0.40 0.40 0.49 0.60 0.55
Lower n/a n/a n/a 0.21 0.29 0.28 0.79 0.19 0.49 0.45 0.29 0.35 0.07 0.12 0.12 0.59 0.42 0.48 0.50 0.21 0.35 0.23 0.89 0.74 0.20 0.88 0.71 0.51 0.33 0.44 0.25 0.23 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.44 0.51 0.48
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 4 12 3 3 83 112 195
0.53 0.55 0.54 0.62 0.52 0.57 1.17 0.73 0.96 0.19 0.21 0.20 1.33 0.45 0.91 0.73 0.46 0.60 0.60 0.73 0.66 0.88 0.50 0.70 0.41 0.61 0.50 0.30 0.30 0.53 0.53 0.69 0.53 0.62
Higher n/a n/a n/a 0.32 0.56 0.44 0.68 0.71 0.68 1.31 0.61 1.04 0.12 0.13 0.12 1.49 0.36 1.17 0.91 0.26 0.68 0.62 0.43 0.53 0.96 0.27 0.73 0.49 0.34 0.43 0.25 0.25 0.44 0.44 0.87 0.45 0.71
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 5 5 5 5 100 81 181
0.44 0.53 0.49 0.61 0.51 0.55 0.93 0.70 0.81 0.18 0.24 0.21 1.07 0.67 0.85 0.63 0.39 0.50 0.53 0.81 0.68 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.52 0.61 0.56 0.40 0.68 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.60 0.57 0.58
Overall n/a n/a n/a 0.29 0.41 0.36 0.71 0.46 0.58 1.04 0.43 0.76 0.10 0.12 0.12 1.19 0.43 0.87 0.75 0.23 0.54 0.48 0.73 0.64 0.75 0.70 0.71 0.50 0.32 0.43 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.36 0.36 0.71 0.49 0.61
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TABLE 12 
Descriptive Statistics  
Post-Evaluation Ratio of Change in Estimate Error to Difficulty Assessment by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔEstimate Error/Difficulty Assessment 
 
where: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error – Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
Final Estimate Error = |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error = |Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, 
how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this jar?” 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
0.07 (0.06) (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.09) (0.06) 0.01 0.01 0.01 (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) 0.01 (0.16) (0.10) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.17) (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) 0.00 0.00 (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)
Lower n/a n/a n/a 0.07 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.14 0.12 0.31 0.18 0.23 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.33 0.27 0.31 0.16 0.22 0.13 0.59 0.47 0.15 0.45 0.36 0.08 0.26 0.16 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.31 0.26
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 8 3 3 83 108 191
(0.12) 0.09 (0.02) (0.03) (0.15) (0.09) (0.41) (0.23) (0.32) (0.08) (0.01) (0.05) (0.50) (0.04) (0.28) 0.10 (0.04) 0.04 0.44 (0.29) 0.09 0.07 0.02 0.05 (0.02) (0.16) (0.07) 0.09 0.09 (0.15) (0.15) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07)
Higher n/a n/a n/a 0.31 0.24 0.29 0.15 0.58 0.41 1.18 0.66 0.95 0.13 0.18 0.15 1.14 0.16 0.85 0.39 0.08 0.29 1.47 0.35 1.13 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.17 0.30 0.22 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.74 0.36 0.61
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 100 77 177
(0.04) 0.00 (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.24) (0.15) (0.19) (0.04) (0.00) (0.02) (0.30) (0.08) (0.18) 0.01 (0.03) (0.01) 0.25 (0.22) (0.01) 0.03 0.01 0.02 (0.03) (0.16) (0.08) 0.01 0.01 (0.09) (0.09) (0.04) (0.07) (0.06)
Overall n/a n/a n/a 0.25 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.38 0.29 0.90 0.44 0.68 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.87 0.27 0.62 0.36 0.13 0.26 1.09 0.50 0.84 0.24 0.36 0.31 0.14 0.26 0.19 0.30 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.56 0.33 0.46
18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 9 27 13 13 8 8 183 185 368
10 11 12 All Periods
Document Initial Assessment
Period
Practice 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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TABLE 13 
Descriptive Statistics  
Pre-Evaluation Ratio of Profit to Difficulty Assessment by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding Outliers) 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Profit/Difficulty Assessment  
(Note: See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, 
how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this jar?” 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
6.45 (0.86) 1.92 (5.24) (2.05) (3.26) 1.55 (6.87) (3.67) 10.44 9.10 9.61 (12.98) (8.26) (10.06) 2.37 6.39 4.86 3.94 6.66 5.62 6.58 (7.63) (2.22) (7.28) (2.65) (5.74) 4.79 (0.77) 2.94 10.89 10.89 1.42 (0.53) 0.30
Lower n/a n/a n/a 4.90 14.57 12.20 24.94 6.14 15.59 11.30 13.21 12.92 2.52 2.86 2.75 23.81 14.69 18.26 15.89 6.36 10.80 7.55 13.56 11.49 9.11 63.02 49.62 26.25 11.27 21.87 5.27 6.90 6.18 4.96 4.96 16.14 23.85 20.89
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 4 12 3 3 83 112 195
0.51 (5.26) (2.22) (0.59) (4.70) (2.53) (6.14) (9.68) (7.82) 8.78 8.87 8.82 (17.53) 1.45 (8.04) 4.10 7.95 5.93 (3.43) (5.10) (4.22) 0.38 8.03 4.21 11.84 9.23 10.60 6.70 6.70 (5.86) (5.86) 0.01 1.20 0.55
Higher n/a n/a n/a 13.76 32.44 23.90 6.27 26.69 18.46 17.16 32.31 24.79 1.97 3.11 2.50 36.76 12.26 28.32 9.30 8.04 8.71 24.38 26.48 24.69 16.14 11.90 14.31 12.34 11.20 11.56 4.54 4.54 24.56 24.56 18.62 21.23 19.80
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 5 5 5 5 98 81 179
3.15 (2.66) (0.05) (2.65) (3.13) (2.92) (2.72) (8.02) (5.64) 9.51 9.00 9.23 (15.39) (4.29) (9.13) 3.33 7.03 5.36 (0.15) 1.85 0.95 3.30 (1.23) 0.75 3.34 5.57 4.28 5.52 (0.77) 4.04 0.42 0.42 0.65 0.19 0.42
Overall n/a n/a n/a 10.92 22.96 18.56 16.81 17.17 16.79 14.96 22.35 19.33 2.32 2.89 2.63 30.49 14.30 23.14 12.27 6.95 9.75 18.77 20.18 19.34 13.29 48.84 37.39 21.45 12.17 17.92 4.90 6.90 5.87 20.66 20.66 17.49 22.75 20.35
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TABLE 14 
Descriptive Statistics  
Post-Evaluation Ratio of Change in Profit to Evaluatee Difficulty Assessment by Period and Experimental Condition (Excluding 
Outliers) 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit /Difficulty Assessment 
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
 
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
(3.44) (0.09) (1.37) (0.54) 0.09 (0.15) 0.66 3.98 2.72 (0.61) (0.45) (0.51) 1.84 1.99 1.93 5.33 0.95 2.62 (1.73) 3.26 1.36 0.46 (2.45) (1.34) 1.27 5.78 2.77 1.07 1.07 (0.39) (0.39) 0.40 1.09 0.79
Lower n/a n/a n/a 3.95 6.74 5.96 1.81 6.03 4.80 7.20 7.32 7.28 0.92 2.29 1.86 4.37 12.96 10.37 15.97 5.15 10.48 4.06 15.15 12.24 2.72 22.40 17.49 5.50 7.87 6.41 5.88 5.88 0.43 0.43 6.47 11.22 9.44
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 4 12 8 8 3 3 83 108 191
4.14 (5.78) (0.56) (1.36) 8.65 3.39 10.24 11.86 11.00 1.01 (0.48) 0.31 9.02 2.20 5.61 (5.89) 0.43 (2.90) 0.56 13.99 7.27 (5.09) (2.22) (3.73) 0.75 0.95 0.82 (3.07) (3.07) 11.70 11.70 1.71 3.41 2.46
Higher n/a n/a n/a 13.84 11.17 13.31 10.58 29.16 21.45 32.49 37.88 34.15 2.00 2.10 2.13 16.38 6.27 12.54 20.77 2.26 15.11 5.69 24.06 18.31 10.73 7.75 9.30 3.79 7.27 4.93 8.71 8.71 24.94 24.94 16.23 19.26 17.60
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 9 9 18 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 98 77 175
0.77 (2.42) (0.98) (0.99) 3.59 1.53 5.98 7.20 6.65 0.29 (0.46) (0.12) 5.64 2.08 3.63 (0.90) 0.74 (0.00) (0.52) 7.65 4.09 (2.62) (2.36) (2.48) 0.98 3.10 1.69 (0.52) (0.52) 7.17 7.17 1.11 2.06 1.59
Overall n/a n/a n/a 11.09 9.04 10.01 7.80 19.06 15.08 24.58 24.35 24.15 1.78 2.16 2.01 12.50 10.53 11.41 19.14 4.14 13.02 4.98 19.51 15.42 8.49 17.60 14.08 4.49 7.49 5.61 7.06 7.06 19.86 19.86 12.71 15.09 13.95
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TABLE 15 
Test of Hypothesis for H3 
Effects of Procedure I vs. Procedure II Work on Estimate Error, Pre-Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Periods Period <=5 Period >5 












Controls:    


















Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 374 160 214 
Adjusted R2 0.14 0.20 0.10 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Table 15 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variables:  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period, (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Evaluatee’s combined “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar before the evaluation, 
calculated as: 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error = 





Effects of Procedure I vs. Procedure II Work on Profit, Pre-Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Periods Period <=5 Period >5 












Controls:    


















Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 374 160 214 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.10 0.07 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Table 16 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variables:  
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period, (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
(Note: See footnote 15 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 





Test of Hypothesis for H3 
Effects of Additional Procedure I vs. Procedure II Work on Changes in Estimate Error, Post-
Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Periods Period <=5 Period >5 












Controls:    
















































Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 368 160 208 
Adjusted R2 0.02 0.08 0.02 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Table 17 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variables:  
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Post-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the updated estimate to submit after the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 
about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this 
jar?” 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 




Table 17 (cont.) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
Change in the evaluatee’s combined “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after the 
evaluation, calculated as: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error–Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
where: 
Final Estimate Error is the evaluatee’s final “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after 
the evaluation, calculated as: 





Effects of Additional Procedure I vs. Procedure II Work on Changes in Profit, Post-
Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 All Periods Period <=5 Period >5 












Controls:    
















































Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 366 160 206 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.08 0.11 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Table 18 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variables:  
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Post-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the updated estimate to submit after the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 
about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this 
jar?” 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
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Table 18 (cont.) 
 
Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 





Descriptive Statistics  
Procedure I Follow by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
  
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
(27.64) (21.92) (24.10) (12.40) (22.60) (18.71) (21.09) (17.53) (18.89) (25.32) (23.04) (23.91) (19.12) (23.14) (21.53) (19.91) (18.10) (18.83) (20.10) (25.67) (23.54) (18.72) (27.15) (23.94) (10.23) (36.82) (17.48) (16.60) (16.60) (20.95) (20.95) (19.18) (22.84) (21.22)
Lower n/a n/a n/a 15.36 18.42 17.16 7.95 16.71 14.68 12.44 15.07 13.91 9.16 15.70 13.36 13.21 20.77 17.84 17.68 19.64 18.42 10.69 16.64 14.63 5.27 17.48 14.52 27.69 20.45 27.83 23.22 23.22 7.41 7.41 15.38 17.40 16.60
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 12 20 8 12 20 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 3 11 8 8 3 3 83 105 188
(23.08) (11.44) (17.57) (12.47) (8.11) (10.40) (17.83) (1.98) (10.32) (22.85) (21.65) (22.28) (19.31) (13.86) (16.89) (24.31) (2.05) (13.77) (20.45) (10.07) (15.53) (19.03) (7.94) (13.78) (22.12) (7.83) (17.36) (16.54) (16.54) (18.60) (18.60) (19.90) (9.46) (15.39)
Higher n/a n/a n/a 20.47 15.56 18.78 31.78 10.69 23.68 23.41 15.53 21.15 19.39 18.49 18.44 30.24 12.86 23.66 20.03 12.66 20.06 20.89 10.58 17.21 25.35 10.94 20.17 14.18 6.92 13.84 18.69 18.69 29.99 29.99 22.62 13.94 19.99
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 8 18 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 100 76 176
(25.11) (17.63) (21.00) (12.44) (16.67) (14.77) (19.28) (11.17) (14.82) (23.95) (22.47) (23.14) (19.23) (19.43) (19.33) (22.36) (11.22) (16.36) (20.29) (19.29) (19.74) (18.89) (19.29) (19.11) (16.84) (18.70) (17.41) (16.58) (16.58) (19.48) (19.48) (19.57) (17.22) (18.41)
Overall n/a n/a n/a 18.01 17.72 18.02 23.68 16.01 19.67 18.88 16.81 18.01 15.33 16.48 15.79 23.58 18.23 20.64 18.61 18.51 19.15 16.68 16.20 16.21 18.76 17.71 17.95 21.43 19.29 20.42 20.76 20.76 23.04 23.04 19.62 17.32 18.52
18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 20 38 18 21 39 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 8 26 13 13 8 8 183 181 364
10 11 12 All Periods
Document Initial Assessment
Period
Practice 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Table 19 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
Dependent Variable:  
Procedure I Follow = Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
(Note: Based on this calculation, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less than) [more than] the amount of additional work 
requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] do?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the [evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure I Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
 (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before the evaluation 




Descriptive Statistics  
Procedure II Follow by Period and Experimental Condition 
Panel A: [Means, Standard Deviation, Cell Size] 
 
  
No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall No Yes Overall
Quantity 
Focus
1.45 (6.39) (3.40) 2.31 1.81 2.00 (2.23) 4.06 1.67 0.80 7.37 4.87 7.21 5.09 5.94 5.86 0.04 2.37 2.26 4.16 3.44 5.02 (4.91) (1.13) 3.33 0.00 2.42 6.64 6.64 9.29 9.29 3.48 1.34 2.29
Lower n/a n/a n/a 15.23 26.63 22.84 30.61 13.42 20.88 19.95 26.79 24.08 10.99 20.36 17.37 24.11 15.07 18.62 21.92 13.10 16.88 14.96 23.58 20.32 11.22 10.05 11.36 8.59 0.00 7.35 14.13 14.13 27.09 27.09 17.74 19.29 18.60
8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 12 20 8 12 20 8 13 21 8 13 21 8 3 11 8 8 3 3 83 105 188
(9.57) (14.41) (11.86) 6.52 2.99 4.85 7.20 5.63 6.45 3.47 0.80 2.20 5.38 (2.25) 1.99 (10.07) (0.13) (5.36) 0.84 2.66 1.70 4.57 7.67 6.04 (2.21) (4.63) (3.02) (6.61) (6.61) 4.77 4.77 0.52 0.08 0.33
Higher n/a n/a n/a 22.22 24.16 22.64 20.75 22.69 21.15 24.42 16.24 20.40 17.79 21.22 18.98 13.96 10.44 12.78 57.41 21.00 43.24 21.79 10.43 16.93 7.53 20.72 14.89 19.25 13.32 17.04 26.80 26.80 8.33 8.33 25.24 18.90 22.66
10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 8 18 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 9 19 10 5 15 5 5 5 5 100 76 176
(4.67) (9.67) (7.42) 4.65 2.29 3.35 3.01 4.70 3.94 2.28 4.68 3.60 6.19 2.15 4.07 (2.99) (0.03) (1.40) 1.47 3.55 2.61 4.77 0.24 2.28 0.25 (2.89) (0.72) 1.54 1.54 6.46 6.46 1.86 0.81 1.34
Overall n/a n/a n/a 19.71 25.37 22.86 24.86 17.30 20.79 22.42 22.61 22.25 14.80 20.48 17.97 18.53 13.61 16.03 44.82 16.46 32.30 18.55 18.96 18.57 9.05 16.17 13.48 15.32 10.35 13.85 20.02 20.02 15.96 15.96 22.15 19.08 20.66
18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 20 38 18 21 39 18 22 40 18 22 40 18 8 26 13 13 8 8 183 181 364
10 11 12 All Periods
Document Initial Assessment
Period
Practice 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
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Table 20 (cont.) 
 
Independent Variable (i.e., Manipulations):  
(1) Quantity Focus (Lower vs. Higher) 
(2) Document Initial Assessment (No vs. Yes) 
 
Quantity Focus is manipulated by either displaying or not displaying messages to evaluators saying that more work by evaluatees can increase an evaluatee’s 
accuracy and the pair’s payoff.  Document Initial Assessment is manipulated by whether evaluators could or could not physically record their initial assessment of 
evaluatees’ work (by moving response sliders on the Likert scale) before chatting with evaluatees (all evaluators can record after chatting).  For manipulation 
screenshots, see Appendix C. 
Dependent Variable:  
Procedure II Follow = Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
(Note: Based on this calculation, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less than) [more than] the amount of additional work 
requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] do?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the [evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
(Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before the evaluation 




Effects of Procedure I Follow vs. Procedure II Follow on Changes in Estimate Error, Post-
Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 






















Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed* 







Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed* 







Controls:    
















































Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 364 288 76 
R2 0.07 0.08 0.34 
Adjusted R2 0.01 0.01 0.15 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Independent Variables:  
Procedure I Follow = Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
 
Procedure II Follow = Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
 
(Note: Based on these calculations, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less 
than) [more than] the amount of additional work requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x 
(%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure I Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
  (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 




Table 21 (cont.) 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the updated estimate to submit after the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 
about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this 
jar?” 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
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Dependent Variable:  
Change in the evaluatee’s combined “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after the 
evaluation, calculated as: 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error–Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
where: 
Final Estimate Error is the evaluatee’s final “estimate error” for the number of marbles of each color in the jar after 
the evaluation, calculated as: 
Final Estimate Error = |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
140 
TABLE 22 
Effects of Additional Procedure I vs. Procedure II Work on Changes in Profit, Post-
Evaluation 
Panel A: Regression 
 (1) (2) (3) 






















Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed* 







Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed* 







Controls:    
















































Period INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
    
Observations 362 286 76 
R2 0.13 0.12 0.35 
Adjusted R2 0.07 0.04 0.12 
p-values in parentheses, two-tailed 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, two-tailed 
† p < 0.10, †† p < 0.05, ††† p < 0.01, one-tailed 
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Independent Variables:  
Procedure I Follow = Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
 
Procedure II Follow = Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
 
(Note: Based on these calculations, a zero (positive) [negative] value represents an evaluatee who did exactly (less 
than) [more than] the amount of additional work requested by the evaluator of that procedure.) 
 
where: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x 
(%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
Additional Procedure I Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed =  
(Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
 (Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 





Table 22 (cont.) 
 
Control Variable(s):  
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the 
evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the updated estimate to submit after the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before 
the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to 
determine the initial estimate to submit before the evaluation 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of 
the round about the difficulty of estimating the number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness 
of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period 
about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this 
jar?” 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure I requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested which is the amount of additional Procedure II requested by evaluators, 
calculated as: 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = 
(Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
where: 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] 
do?” with Likert response scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a 
middle point of “Double” (50) 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the 
[evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” with Likert response scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
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Dependent Variable:  
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
(Note: See footnote 16 for additional information regarding outliers.) 
 
where: 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the 
evaluation 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
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APPENDIX A: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
(Sorted Alphabetically) 
ΔEstimate Error = Final Estimate Error – Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error 
 
ΔProfit = Final Profit – Pre-Evaluation Profit 
 
%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
 
%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed =  
 Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed /  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
 
%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the [evaluatee] spend on Procedure I?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “What percentage of the additional work should the [evaluatee] spend on Procedure II?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from 0% to 100% 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Performed = (Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_I_Work_Performed) x 50 
 
Additional Procedure I Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_I_Work_Requested) 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Performed = (Total_Additional_Work_Performed) x (%_Additional_Procedure_II_Work_Performed) x 50 
 
Additional Procedure II Work Requested = (Total_Additional_Work_Requested) x (%_Procedure_II_Work_Requested) 
 
Difficulty Assessment is each evaluatees’ response to the following question asked at the beginning of each period about the new jar, “On a scale from 1 to 100, 
how hard is it to guess the number of each marble color in this jar?” 
 
Difficulty Assessment Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent answering questions at the beginning of the round about the difficulty of estimating the 
number of marbles of each color in the jar and the usefulness of Procedure I and Procedure II procedures to improve the estimate 
 
Final Estimate Error = |Final Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Final Estimate Error for Color 2| 
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APPENDIX A (cont.) 
Final Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their final estimate at the end of the round 
 
Payoff for round = E$750 - E$67.50 x (# Minutes [Evaluatee] Spent on Either Procedure and Difficulty Assessment) 
  –( Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 1)2 – (Evaluatee’s Estimate Error for Color 2)2 
 
Period which is an indicator variable for each period, (e.g., Period 2, Period 3, etc.) 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I after the evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II after the evaluation 
 
Post-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to determine the updated estimate to submit 
after the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error = |Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 1|+|Pre-Evaluation Estimate Error for Color 2| 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure I before the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on Procedure II before the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Profit is the Payoff for round calculated after the evaluatee submits their initial estimate before the evaluation 
 
Pre-Evaluation Submit Estimate Time which is the time (seconds) the evaluatee spent on the screen allowing them to determine the initial estimate to submit before 
the evaluation 
 
Procedure I Follow = Additional Procedure I Work Requested - Additional Procedure I Work Performed 
 
Procedure II Follow = Additional Procedure II Work Requested - Additional Procedure II Work Performed 
 
Total_Additional_Work_Performed =  
 (Post-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Post-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) / 
(Pre-Evaluation Procedure I Work Performed + Pre-Evaluation Procedure II Work Performed) 
 
Total_Additional_Work_Requested is evaluators’ response to “Overall, how much more work should the [evaluatee] do?” 
Response: Likert scale ranging from “No more work” (0) to “More than double” (100) with a middle point of “Double” (50) 
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APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENTAL MANIPULATIONS 
Work Quantity Focus Manipulations 
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The following pages provide screenshots of the experimental instrument from zTree (Fischbacher 2007). 
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